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INTRODUCTION 
The doctrines of trademark genericism and functionality serve 
similar functions under the Lanham Act and the common law of 
unfair competition. Genericism, in the context of word marks, and 
functionality, for trade dress, bar trademark registration under the 
Lanham Act and, both under the Act and at common law, render a 
trademark unprotectable and invalid. In the word mark context, 
genericism stands for the proposition that certain parts of vocabu-
lary cannot be cordoned off as trademarks; all competitors must be 
able to use words that consumers understand to identify the goods 
or services that they are selling.1 Functionality likewise demands 
that certain aspects of product design cannot be legally protected as 
trade dress, as to do so would potentially limit competitors’ ability 
to make products that work as well at the same price. The core 
concern, for both doctrines, is or should be the preservation of free 
and fair market competition. 
Part I of this Article explains the theoretical parallels between 
the doctrines of genericism and functionality, and examines the 
history and purpose of these doctrines. A finding that a word is or 
has become generic, or that a form of trade dress is functional, ne-
gates a mark’s registration and protection under the Lanham Act, 
as well as under state and common law. Even incontestable marks 
can be declared invalid, regardless of the passage of time, under 
either doctrine. The types of trademarks typically at issue when 
making genericism and functionality determinations—word marks 
that are, at best, descriptive, or product design functioning as trade 
dress—are correctly described as weak. The genericism and func-
tionality doctrines therefore play a critical role in marking the 
boundaries of trademark law. To properly draw those lines, deci-
                                                                                                                            
1 The focus of this definition is on the availability of the words to competitors, not the 
public at large, because a different trademark doctrine aims to insulate all public, non-
commercial uses of words (even those that are arbitrary or fanciful marks) from trademark 
protection: fair use. See, e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 
543 U.S. 111, 121–23 (2004) (holding that, while descriptive fair use is not defeated by a 
showing of likelihood of confusion, the degree of confusion may be pertinent to whether 
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark is fair); Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret 
Stores Brand Mgmt. Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1041–43 (9th Cir. 2010) (defining and applying 
descriptive fair use doctrine); Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 
1175–83 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying test for nominative fair use). 
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sion makers need to correctly define and understand the theory 
underlying both doctrines. 
In Part II, this Article argues that both genericism and functio-
nality, in their practical interpretation and purpose, should more 
clearly reflect the core principle of protecting fair competition. In 
particular, the concept of viable, competitive alternatives—either 
in the form of words or alternative designs—should play an en-
hanced role in determining whether an erstwhile trademark is ge-
neric or functional. The various tests for genericism and functio-
nality currently employed by the courts often attempt to draw for-
malistic  distinctions among categories of words or product fea-
tures that may confound business owners (and their lawyers) and 
divert the focus of the courts’ inquiry in such cases away from the 
core value at the heart of both doctrines: preserving fair competi-
tion. 
I.   THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE GENERICISM AND 
FUNCTIONALITY DOCTRINES 
As noted above, both trademark genericism and functionality 
originated as doctrines under the common law and now act as bars 
to registration and trademark protection under the Lanham Act.2 
They share similar roots: As the common law of unfair competition 
expanded to protect source identifiers outside the scope of a tech-
nical trademark (i.e., an inherently distinctive word mark), courts 
developed concomitant limitations to curb the potential for overly 
expansive protections that would hinder competition.3 Courts were 
also concerned that protecting certain types of word marks and 
trade dress under the auspices of trademark law could effectively 
evade constitutionally mandated limits on the patent monopoly.4 
The genericism and functionality doctrines reflect these develop-
ments and concerns. When Congress passed the Lanham Act in 
1946, the doctrines took on additional significance, as the benefits 
of federal registration expanded exponentially.5 Flexible common 
                                                                                                                            
2 See infra Sections I.A–I.B. 
3 See infra notes 26–31, 69 and accompanying text. 
4 See infra notes 27–28, 70 and accompanying text. 
5 Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (amended 1988). 
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law rules have been supplanted by more rigid tests for genericism 
and functionality that have created uncertainty and confusion for 
courts and litigants alike. 
A.   The Common-Law Roots and Modern Evolution of the Genericism 
Doctrine 
The trademark law prohibition on the protection of generic 
words or phrases originated, like most aspects of trademark law, in 
the common law of unfair competition.6 However, the judicial need 
to draw a bright line between descriptive words or phrases and ge-
neric ones did not. Two main aspects of the Lanham Act of 1946 
changed the scope and significance of genericism analysis: (1) the 
Lanham Act allowed trademark registration and protection of de-
scriptive, but not generic, words or terms that had acquired sec-
ondary meaning; and (2) it increased the value of federal trademark 
registration by extending nationwide priority in a mark to the regi-
strant.7 Both changes significantly increased the potential impact of 
a finding that a putative trademark was, or had become, generic. 
Even as the genericism doctrine has evolved to become a critical 
aspect of trademark law, courts have struggled to formulate a 
workable definition of the doctrine. 
1.   Common-Law Treatment of Generic and Descriptive 
Words 
Under the common law, particularly prior to the enactment of 
the Lanham Act in 1946, most courts treated descriptive and gener-
ic terms in a similar fashion: neither was protectable as a technical 
trademark,8 but both were entitled to protection against passing off, 
if they had acquired distinctiveness (i.e., they had evolved in the 
                                                                                                                            
6 See Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1811–20 (2007) (examining and explaining the common-law roots 
of the genericism and genericide doctrines). 
7 See infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
8 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 721 (AM. LAW INST. 1938) (“A designation 
cannot be a trade-mark for goods if it is likely to be regarded by prospective purchasers as 
a common name or generic name for such goods or as descriptive of them or of their 
ingredients, quality, properties, functions or uses.”); see also id. § 715(c) (noting that a 
trademark cannot be “a common or generic name for the goods or a picture of them . . . or 
a designation descriptive of the goods or of their quality, ingredients, properties or 
functions”). 
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minds of consumers into source-identifying marks).9 Therefore, a 
court’s determination that a word or term was generic versus de-
scriptive, or descriptive versus generic, was not highly consequen-
tial. In fact, some early common-law sources classified descriptive 
words as a subset of generic terms.10 If a business owner could 
prove that either a descriptive or generic term had acquired distinc-
tiveness, and therefore was acting as a source identifier, it would be 
considered a “trade name” and hence protected against passing 
off.11 If the word or term was inherently distinctive, it would be en-
                                                                                                                            
9 Several courts have held that generic or descriptive names may be protected against 
unfair competition if they have acquired secondary meaning. See, e.g., Bell v. Davidson, 
597 P.2d 753, 755 (Okla. 1979); Staple Cotton Coop. Ass’n v. Fed. Staple Cotton Co-Op 
Ass’n, 162 So.2d 867, 869–70 (Miss. 1964); Storm v. Canyon Amusement Corp., 79 
N.W.2d 698, 700 (S.D. 1956); Golden Slipper Square Club v. Golden Slipper Rest. & 
Catering, 88 A.2d 734, 736 (Pa. 1952); Farrell v. Mennen Co., 235 P.2d 128, 130 (Utah 
1951); Bernstein v. Friedman, 160 P.2d 227, 229 (Wyo. 1945); Jenney Mfg. Co. v. Leader 
Filling Stations Corp., 196 N.E. 852, 854 (Mass. 1935). 
For examples of cases discussing secondary meaning, see Electric Supply Co. v. Hess, 
245 P. 27, 28 (Wash. 1926), which notes that secondary meaning doctrine applies to 
“common, descriptive [and] generic words,” and Saunders System Atlanta Co. v. Drive It 
Yourself Co. of Georgia, 123 S.E. 132, 136 (Ga. 1924). 
Other courts have held that neither generic nor descriptive terms are entitled to 
trademark protection without a showing of secondary meaning. See, e.g., MacPhail v. 
Stevens, 586 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Colo. App. 1978); Williamson v. Answer Phone of 
Jacksonville, Inc., 118 So.2d 248, 251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Better Bus. Bureau of 
Kan. City Advert. Club, Inc. v. Chappell, 307 S.W.2d 510, 515 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957); 
Hartzler v. Goshen Churn & Ladder Co., 104 N.E. 34, 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 1914). 
For an example of a case finding that either generic or descriptive trade names may 
be entited to protection upon a showing of secondary meaning, see Anti-Defamation 
League of B’nai B’rith v. Arab Anti-Defamation League, 340 N.Y.S.2d 532, 534–44 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1972). 
10 See Speaker v. Shaler Co., 87 F.2d 985, 987 (7th Cir. 1937) (noting that “descriptive 
words” are “included within the broader category of generic terms”); JAMES LOVE 
HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (4th 
ed. 1924) (defining a “generic term” as any term that is “too general . . . in its meaning to 
become the monopoly of an individual in application to merchandise,” including 
geographical names, proper names, and descriptive words); see also Milton Handler & 
Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names—An Analysis and Synthesis: I, 30 COLUM. 
L. REV. 168, 168–70 (1930) (explaining the technical differences between trademarks and 
trade names). 
11 See, e.g., Houston v. Berde, 2 N.W.2d 9, 10 (Minn. 1942) (noting when “generic 
words are used in a trade-name,” their use will be restrained when such use causes 
confusion or deception); Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Benson, 104 P.2d 650, 
652 (Cal. 1940) (noting deceptive use of “generic, descriptive, personal, and geographic 
names” that have acquired secondary meaning constitutes unfair competition). 
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titled to protection as a technical trademark, regardless of whether 
it had acquired distinctiveness. A mark is considered inherently 
distinctive when its “intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular 
source of a product.”12 To be considered inherently distinctive, 
and thus qualify as a technical trademark, a mark had to be non-
descriptive (i.e., fanciful or arbitrary).13 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the rights 
invested in a technical trademark (as opposed to a trade name) 
were broader and more absolute than typically thought.14 To prove 
infringement, the trademark owner did not have to show “fraud,” 
or a deliberate intent to deceive consumers, on the part of the de-
fendant.15 Courts generally required evidence of fraud to prove the 
tort of “passing off” based on the misuse of a trade name (a source 
identifier that did not qualify as a technical trademark).16 Although 
                                                                                                                            
12 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). 
13 Handler & Pickett, supra note 10, at 169. 
14 See, e.g., In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (characterizing trademarks 
as “a property right”); see also Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 617, 619 (1879) (“The right to 
use the trade-mark is not limited to any place, city, or State, and, therefore, must be 
deemed to extend everywhere.”); Apollo Bros. v. Perkins, 207 F. 530, 533 (3d Cir. 1913) 
(observing that the law “only permits a monopoly in the use of a trade-mark when it has 
become the absolute and exclusive property of the first user—good against the world”); 
HOPKINS, supra note 10, § 4 (opining that trademark rights are “broader and by far . . . 
more valuable” than rights to a trade name); Grafton Dulany Cushing, On Certain Cases 
Analogous to Trade-Marks, 4 HARV. L. REV. 321, 322 (1891) (noting that “[a] trademark 
has become an absolute right”); Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: 
A Critical History of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 317–19 (1979) 
(characterizing early treatment of technical trademarks as conferring monopolistic 
property rights); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The 
Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 343–44 (1980) 
(describing early treatment of trademarks as “absolute property”). 
15 See Apollo Bros., 207 F. at 533 (“A technical trade-mark . . . is treated as property, 
and an infringement thereof carries with it the presumption of fraud; but where no such 
exclusive right to the use of such trade-mark exists, a technical trade-mark right is not 
established, and fraud—unfair competition—in the use of the mark must be proved.”); 
HOPKINS, supra note 10, § 22 (noting that “fraud is presumed from the wrongful use of a 
trademark”); McClure, supra note 14, at 317 (observing that, in this era, a plaintiff in a 
trademark infringement case “was not required to show actual confusion of purchasers or 
a fraudulent intent by the defendant”). 
16 See HOPKINS, supra note 10, § 22 (“While fraud is presumed from the wrongful use 
of a trademark it must be proven, directly or by inference, in all cases of unfair 
competition which do not involve a technical trademark.”); Cushing, supra note 14, at 332 
(noting that in “cases analogous to trade-marks,” i.e., cases involving common law trade 
names, “fraud is the gist of the action”); see also HOPKINS, supra note 10, § 61 (stating 
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early cases required a showing of intentional passing off by the de-
fendant to prove fraud, and thus liability for misuse of another’s 
trade name, the law evolved to eliminate the intent requirement 
and focus instead on likelihood of confusion on the part of consum-
ers.17 
The legal advantage of an inherently distinctive technical 
trademark over a trade name (protectable only with a showing of 
acquired distinctiveness) dissipated relatively quickly under the 
common law.18 In an article considered groundbreaking at the time, 
Columbia law professors Milton Handler and Charles Picket ar-
gued in 1930 that legal protection of trademarks and trade names 
had merged, although the courts did not always recognize that they 
had done so, with less absolute protection being granted to trade-
marks and greater protection being extended to trade names: both 
were protected against uses that led to a likelihood of consumer 
confusion.19 Handler and Picket were at the forefront of the Legal 
Realism movement, as they argued that courts should discard for-
malistic labels in favor of a pragmatic approach to trademark law 
that focused on the manner in which marks actually functioned in 
the commercial marketplace.20 Handler and Pickett’s theory was 
confirmed in the First Restatement of Torts, published in 1938, 
which observed that “there are no important differences between 
                                                                                                                            
that use of “merely descriptive word” will not be restrained unless circumstances show 
“fraud on the part of the user”); McClure, supra note 14, at 317 (observing that, during 
this era, a plaintiff in an action for unfair competition or passing off would be required to 
prove both “actual deception of purchasers and fraudulent intent by the defendant”). 
17 See Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1813–14 (discussing this trend and citing cases); 
see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 717 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1938) (noting that 
fraud “is not essential to infringement of either a trade-mark or a trade name”). 
18 See Church & Dwight Co. v. Russ, 99 F. 276, 278 (C.C.D. Ind. 1900) (“The 
tendency of the courts at the present time seems to be to restrict the scope of the law 
applicable to technical trade-marks, and to extend its scope in cases of unfair 
competition.” (citations omitted)); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 717 cmt. a 
(observing that “there are no important differences between the protection given to the 
interest in trade-marks and that given to the interest in trade names”). 
19 Handler & Pickett, supra note 10, at 200 (concluding that “the supposedly sharp line 
of demarcation [between trademarks and trade names] is being obliterated”). 
20 See Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward A Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 
TEX. L. REV. 267, 272 n.24 (1997) (characterizing Professor Milton Handler as a legal 
realist); see also Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean 
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1237 (1931) (characterizing Handler as a realist in the field 
of “trade-marks and advertising”). 
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the protection given to the interest in trade-marks and that given to 
the interest in trade names.”21 
One difference remained, however, between trade names and 
technical trademarks: only trademarks could be registered under 
federal law.22 Under the Trade-Mark Act of 1905, descriptive 
terms could not be registered.23 The only exception was the so-
called “ten-year clause,” which provided that any name that had 
been “in actual and exclusive use as a trademark” for ten or more 
years prior to the enactment of the statute could be registered, re-
gardless of whether it qualified as a technical trademark.24 This dis-
tinction, however, was not of great practical importance, as the 
benefits of registration under the 1905 Act were limited.25 
Although the common law did treat generic and descriptive 
terms similarly, the courts also recognized the potentially negative 
competitive implications of restricting competitors’ use of generic 
terms.26 The cases in which these issues arose typically involved 
disputes regarding intellectual property rights in trademarks or 
trade names attached to patents, after the patent’s expiration. In 
this context, the genericism doctrine reflected the courts’ concern 
that trademark law would effectively and illegitimately extend the 
life of the patent monopoly. For example, in discussing the status 
                                                                                                                            
21 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 717 cmt. a. 
22 Trademark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, § 5, 33 Stat. 724, 728 (repealed 1946) 
(prohibiting registration of a trademark “which consists . . . merely in words or devices 
which are descriptive of the goods with which they are used, or of the character or quality 
of such goods, or merely a geographical name or term”). 
23 See id. 
24 Id.; Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids, 233 U.S. 461, 465–67 (1914) (interpreting the 
ten-year clause); Barber-Colman Co. v. Overhead Door Corp., 65 F.2d 147, 150 (C.C.P.A. 
1933) (holding that mark which has acquired secondary meaning, but is not a technical 
trademark, cannot be registered under Trade-Mark Act of 1905 unless the ten-year clause 
applies). 
25 Registration of a mark under the 1905 Act served as prima facie evidence of mark 
validity and ownership of the mark. See Sylvester J. Liddy, The Lanham Act—An Analysis, 
86 TRADEMARK REP. 421, 422 (1996) (originally published in 37 TRADEMARK REP. 87 
(1947)). However, mark registration did not confer nationwide priority in the mark; the 
benefits of registration extended no farther than the geographical reach of the goodwill of 
the mark. See infra note 34 and accompanying text. Moreover, the concept of mark 
incontestability did not exist under the 1905 Act. 
26 Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June 
Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896). 
700         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:691 
 
of the word “Singer” denoting a particular brand of sewing ma-
chine, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that “along with the pub-
lic ownership of the [formerly patented] device there must also 
necessarily pass to the public the generic designation of the thing 
which has arisen during the monopoly . . . .”27 To do otherwise, the 
Court wrote, would “disregard the public dedication [of the for-
merly patented invention] and practically perpetuate indefinitely 
an exclusive right.”28 
However, these early cases did not divorce the concept of gene-
ricism from the secondary meaning doctrine, or acquired distinc-
tiveness. In discussing the trademark status of “Shredded Wheat” 
breakfast cereal, the Court applied the primary significance test to 
determine whether the mark at issue was protectable: 
[T]o establish a trade name in the term ‘shredded 
wheat’ the plaintiff must show more than a subordi-
nate meaning which applies to it. It must show that 
the primary significance of the term in the minds of 
the consuming public is not the product but the 
producer. This it has not done.29 
The Court found that, to the extent “shredded wheat” re-
tained any source-identifying significance, it was as a “subordinate 
meaning” of the term.30 Moreover, even as to terms classified as 
“generic” under this definition, the Court recognized a duty on the 
part of competitors to avoid passing off by using the generic term 
“fairly”—i.e., in a way that “reasonably distinguishes its product 
from that of the plaintiff.”31 
                                                                                                                            
27 Singer, 163 U.S. at 185; see also Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 118 (“Since during the life of the 
patents ‘Shredded Wheat’ was the general designation of the patented product, there 
passed to the public upon the expiration of the patent, not only the right to make the 
article as it was made during the patent period, but also the right to apply thereto the 
name by which it had become known.”). 
28 Singer, 163 U.S. at 185–86. 
29 Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 118 (emphasis added). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 120; see also Singer, 163 U.S. at 187 (reasoning that the “right to use the name 
because of its generic signification” did not “imply a power to destroy any good will [sic] 
which belonged to the original maker” or to “deceive and defraud the public by so using 
the name as to delude them into believing that the machine made by one person was made 
by another”). 
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2.   Changes Wrought by the Lanham Act 
The repeal of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 and subsequent pas-
sage of the Lanham Act in 1946 changed two aspects of trademark 
law with respect to the treatment of generic words or phrases. Both 
changes heightened the significance of a judicial determination that 
a word or term was generic. First, it created a distinction between 
“merely descriptive” terms and “common descriptive” (i.e., ge-
neric) ones: the former became registrable, with a showing of ac-
quired distinctiveness; the latter did not.32  Second, it greatly en-
hanced the significance of federal trademark registration by giving 
the registrant nationwide priority in the mark;33 the extent of a re-
gistrant’s priority was no longer limited by the geographic reach of 
his goodwill.34 Therefore, the judicial construction of a dividing 
line between generic and descriptive terms became much more 
critical and significant. 
The current version of the Lanham Act extends no protection 
to words or terms considered generic, even if the word or term was, 
at one point, a registered, inherently distinctive trademark.35 The 
Act codifies the doctrine of genericide by stating that, if a mark be-
comes “the generic name for the goods or services on or in connec-
tion with which it is used,” for any reason, it is considered aban-
doned and is no longer a valid trademark.36 A mark that is deemed 
generic can never achieve “incontestable” status.37 If a valid mark 
becomes generic, it can be canceled at any time, even if it would 
                                                                                                                            
32 Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, §§ 2(e), (f), 15(4), 60 Stat. 427, 429, 434 (1946) 
(amended 1988). 
33 Trade-Mark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, § 5, 33 Stat. 724, 726 (1905) (repealed 
1946). 
34 See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918); cf. Dawn 
Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364, 365 (2d Cir. 1959) (noting that 
if the plaintiff’s expansion of business into the defendant’s trading area is probable, and 
concurrent use of the marks would give rise to a likelihood of confusion, then the plaintiff 
may enjoin the defendant from using its mark in that retail area). 
35 See generally Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C §§ 1051–1141n (2012). 
36 § 1127. The Act ties abandonment via genericide to the “course of conduct” of the 
mark’s owner, “including acts of omission as well as commission,” implying that the 
mark’s owner has a duty to police unauthorized uses of the mark to prevent it from 
becoming generic. Id. 
37 See § 1065(4) (providing that “no incontestable right shall be acquired in a mark 
which is the generic name for the goods or services or a portion thereof, for which it is 
registered”). 
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otherwise be considered incontestable.38 If a defendant to an in-
fringement lawsuit claims the plaintiff’s unregistered mark is ge-
neric, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that it is not.39 
As noted above, descriptive terms are treated differently under 
the Lanham Act. Descriptive terms may be registered with a show-
ing of acquired distinctiveness.40 Moreover, an “incontestable” 
mark is not subject to challenge on the grounds that it is descriptive 
and lacks such acquired distinctiveness (and perhaps never had it 
in the first place).41 Therefore, the dividing line between generic 
and descriptive terms constitutes the de facto boundary of protect-
able word marks: words or terms found to lie on the generic side of 
the fence cannot function as trademarks. 
3.   Judicial Attempts to Define Genericism as Codified in the 
Lanham Act 
The Lanham Act provides only one definition of the word “ge-
neric” in the context of the statutory section regarding mark can-
cellation: “The primary significance of the registered mark to the 
relevant public rather than purchaser motivation shall be the test 
for determining whether the registered mark has become the gener-
ic name of goods or services on or in connection with which it has 
                                                                                                                            
38 § 1064(3) (providing that a mark may be cancelled “[a]t any time if the registered 
mark becomes the generic name for the goods or services, or a portion thereof, for which 
it is registered”); see also § 1115(b)(2) (providing that an incontestable mark may be 
subject to the defense that it has been abandoned by the registrant). 
39 Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ’ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (“If a supposedly valid mark is not federally registered . . . the plaintiff has the 
burden of proving nongenericness once the defendant asserts genericness as a defense.”); 
see also Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1041 
(D.C. Cir. 1989); A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 297 (3d Cir. 1986). 
40 See § 1052. Although § 1052(e)(1) bars registration of marks that are “merely 
descriptive” of the goods of the applicant, § 1052(f) nonetheless allows registration of 
such marks if they have “become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce.” 
Other marks that are registrable only with a showing of acquired distinctiveness, under 
§ 1052(f), include “deceptively misdescriptive” marks (§ 1052(e)(1)), “primarily 
geographically descriptive” marks (§ 1052(e)(2)), and marks that are “primarily merely a 
surname” (§ 1052(e)(4)). 
41 Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 196 (1985) (holding that 
“[m]ere descriptiveness is not recognized by either [section] 15 or [section] 33(b) as a 
basis for challenging an incontestable mark”). 
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been used.”42 In doing so, the Act appears to have codified the 
common-law “primary significance” test articulated by the Su-
preme Court in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,43 albeit at least 
facially only in cases involving the genericide of formerly regis-
tered, presumably valid marks.44 Courts have expanded beyond this 
definition of “generic,” however, in attempting to delineate a 
boundary between words or terms that are potentially subject to 
trademark protections and those that are not. 
Perhaps the most common judicial definition of a generic word 
or term is borrowed from the world of science: “A ‘generic’ term 
is one that refers, or has come to be understood as referring, to the 
genus of which the particular product or service is a species. It can-
not become a trademark under any circumstances.”45 A corollary 
of the genus/species terminology is the “who are you/what are 
you?” test.46 Under this analysis: “A mark answers the buyer’s 
questions ‘Who are you?’ ‘Where do you come from?’ ‘Who 
vouches for you?’ But the [generic] name of the product answers 
the question ‘What are you?’”47 In practice, these tests have prov-
en difficult to apply.48 
                                                                                                                            
42 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012). 
43 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938). 
44 This section of the Act was adopted specifically to reject the Ninth Circuit’s 
“purchaser motivation test” for genericism, as articulated in Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. 
General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 305–06 (9th Cir. 1979). See Wayne F. Osoba, 
Note, The Legislative Response to Anti-Monopoly: A Missed Opportunity to Clarify the 
Genericness Doctrine, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 197, 209–11 (1985) (discussing legislative 
response to the Anti-Monopoly decision and resulting amendment of the Lanham Act). 
45 Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ’ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th 
Cir. 1999); see also Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 194; Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Med. Dental 
Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 1979); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting 
World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
46 See Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1147. 
47 Id. (quoting Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1993)); 
see also Soc’y of Fin. Exam’rs v. Nat’l Ass’n of Certified Fraud Exam’rs, 41 F.3d 223, 227 
(5th Cir. 1995); CES Publ’g Corp. v. St. Regis Publ’ns, 531 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1975). 
48 See, e.g., A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 296–97 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(noting the recognized difficulties of distinguishing among suggestive, descriptive, and 
generic terms); Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1826–30 (discussing difficulties arising 
from courts’ attempts to distinguish between genus and species, or generic and 
descriptive terms); Arthur J. Greenbaum, Jane C. Ginsburg & Steven M. Weinberg, A 
Proposal for Evaluating Genericism After “Anti-Monopoly,” 73 TRADEMARK REP. 101, 109–
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The resultant uncertainty—particularly in terms of drawing 
distinctions between generic and descriptive names—imposes 
costs on consumers and competitors alike.49 As discussed above, a 
descriptive name that has acquired secondary meaning is entitled 
to the full protection of the Lanham Act, just like an inherently dis-
tinctive mark.50 However, it may take years of use and advertising 
to create that secondary meaning—in other words, it is expensive 
to teach consumers that a descriptive mark identifies a specific 
source. If the mark owner succeeds in doing so, her money and ef-
fort may nonetheless be wasted if a court (or the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office) later determines that the mark is generic. If the 
mark is deemed generic, despite its acquisition of secondary mean-
ing, and no restrictions are placed on its use by competitors, then 
consumers may be harmed because they may be deceived. 
B.  Functionality’s Grounding in the Common Law and the TrafFix 
Pileup 
Like descriptive and generic word marks, trade dress was in-
itially ineligible for protection as a trademark under the common 
law.51 However, just like weaker word marks (formerly known as 
trade names), trade dress was entitled to more limited forms of 
protection against unfair competition, particularly in cases involv-
ing deliberate deception.52 Even in these very early cases, however, 
functional trade dress was exempt from prohibitions on copying by 
competitors.53 As the common law has evolved, the functionality 
doctrine has waxed and waned in terms of its expansiveness, but 
two themes have consistently illuminated the doctrine: (1) the need 
to limit protection of trade dress when a prohibition on copying it 
would put competitors at an unfair disadvantage; and (2) the need 
to preserve the boundary between patent and trademark law by 
eliminating trade dress protections that conflict with the policy and 
                                                                                                                            
10 (1983) (noting the “long-standing, widely-embraced fallacy that genericism may be 
determined by dividing the relevant world of goods into genuses and species”). 
49 Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1829 (discussing costs imposed on consumers and 
trademark holders by ambiguous distinction between generic and descriptive terms). 
50 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
51 See infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
52 See infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
53 See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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purpose of federal patent law.54 Although the federal courts ap-
peared to have settled on a flexible, factors-based functionality test 
that emphasized fair competition, the Supreme Court in TrafFix 
Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc. supplanted that rule with a 
two-part test.55 TrafFix held that a product feature is functional if 
(1) it is “essential to the use or purpose of the article,” or (2) it 
“affects the cost or quality of the article.”56 Although TrafFix ap-
peared to create a bright-line rule, it did not engender consistency 
or predictability in the functionality doctrine. The circuits are split 
in their interpretations of TrafFix, particularly as to relevance (or 
lack thereof) of alternative designs.57 
1.   The Common-Law Expansion of Trade Dress Protection 
and the Consequent Rise of the Functionality Doctrine 
Like descriptive or generic words or phrases, a product’s trade 
dress was not eligible for protection as a trademark under the 
common law.58 Not surprisingly, even distinctive forms of trade 
dress were not registrable as trademarks under the Trade-Mark Act 
of 1905.59 However, not unlike the common-law trade name, if a 
form of trade dress had acquired distinctiveness—that is, it was 
acting as a source identifier in the minds of consumers—courts of 
equity were reluctant to allow competitors to copy the trade dress 
and thereby pass off their goods as those of the plaintiff (particular-
ly if they did so deliberately).60 Claims for unfair competition or 
                                                                                                                            
54 See discussion infra Section I.B.1. 
55 532 U.S. 23, 31 (2001). 
56 Id. 
57 See infra notes 129–35 and accompanying text. 
58 See Mark Alan Thurmon, The Rise and Fall of Trademark Law’s Functionality 
Doctrine, 56 FLA. L. REV. 243, 256–57 (2004) (noting that early common-law courts 
“summarily rejected” efforts to obtain trademark protection in various forms of trade 
dress). 
59 Trade-Mark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, § 5, 33 Stat. 724, 724 (1905) (repealed 
1946). The ten-year clause applied only to word marks, and therefore did not enable the 
registration of any distinctive forms of trade dress. 
60 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 741 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1938) (noting 
that unprivileged imitation of a product feature was prohibited when “the feature in fact 
identifies source and the imitation is likely to deceive prospective purchasers who care 
about source”); Thurmon, supra note 58, at 257–58 (noting that although “early courts 
refused to give full trademark status to nontraditional product identifiers, they did 
recognize the need to provide some protection” to them); see also Cook & Bernheimer 
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passing off based on defendant’s copying of plaintiff’s trade dress, 
like claims based on defendant’s imitation of plaintiff’s trade name, 
turned on two questions: (1) whether plaintiff’s trade dress had ac-
quired distinctiveness; and (2) whether defendant’s copying of that 
trade dress led to a likelihood of consumer confusion.61 
As the distinctions between legal protection of common-law 
trademarks and trade names faded, so too did restrictions on the 
protection of trade dress as a nontraditional form of source iden-
tifier. Courts began to recognize that various forms of trade dress, 
just like word marks or logos, could function as trademarks.62 
Modern courts have broadly defined trade dress to include “the 
total image of a product” and recognize that it “may include fea-
tures such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, 
graphics, or even particular sales techniques.”63 
The Lanham Act currently reflects this more expansive inter-
pretation of trade dress and its ability to function as a source iden-
tifier. The Act now broadly defines a “trademark” to include any 
“word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof” used 
in commerce to “identify and distinguish” the goods of the regi-
                                                                                                                            
Co. v. Ross, 73 F. 203, 205–06 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896) (finding unfair competition by 
defendant based on copying of plaintiff’s square-shaped whiskey bottle, such that the 
“consumer, deceived by the shape, will mistake the bottle for one of [the plaintiff’s]”). 
61 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 741(b) (prohibiting unprivileged imitation of the 
physical appearance of goods when (1) “the copied or imitated feature has acquired 
generally in the market a special significance identifying the other’s goods”; and (2) “the 
copy or imitation is likely to cause prospective purchasers to regard his goods as those of 
the other”). As explained further below, non-functionality was also a requirement for 
protection of trade dress. § 741(b)(ii). 
62 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 161–62 (1995) (holding that 
color alone could be registered as a trademark under the Lanham Act); Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach, 84 IOWA L. REV. 611, 621–22 
(1999) (observing that, over time, “the categories of subject matter protected as 
trademarks grew to encompass the packaging or receptacles in which products were 
contained”). 
63 Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting John H. 
Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983)). However, as 
Professor J. Thomas McCarthy aptly noted: “To state that something is capable of trade 
dress protection is hardly the same as concluding that it [is] likely to or has become valid 
and legally protectable trade dress.” 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 8:4 (4th ed. 2016). Trade dress is protectable 
only if it is both (1) distinctive, either through inherent or acquired distinctiveness, and 
(2) nonfunctional. Id. § 8:1. 
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strant and to indicate their source.64 The Act protects both regis-
tered and unregistered trade dress from infringement.65 The Su-
preme Court has held that some forms of trade dress, primarily 
product packaging and logos, may be considered “inherently dis-
tinctive,” and therefore are protectable under the Lanham Act 
even if they lack evidence of acquired distinctiveness.66 In this as-
pect, the Lanham Act treats these types of trade dress more favor-
ably than descriptive or other types of word marks that were pre-
viously classified as “trade names” under the common law. The 
Court has held that two other types of trade dress, product design 
and color, can never be considered inherently distinctive.67 These 
forms of trade dress are protectable only with a showing of ac-
quired distinctiveness,68 similar to descriptive word marks. 
With regard to trade dress in the form of product design, the 
courts have consistently recognized the potentially negative com-
petitive effects of extending trademark protection to useful product 
features—what is now known as the doctrine of functionality. Early 
common-law decisions that recognized product design as a form of 
protectable trade dress (although not as a technical trademark) em-
phasized that, even though unfair competition may exist when “the 
defendant, a competitor, has unnecessarily and knowingly imitated 
his rival’s devices to such an extent that purchasers are likely to be 
deceived by the resemblance of the devices,” such copying was 
                                                                                                                            
64 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). Service marks likewise include any “word, name, symbol, 
or device, or any combination thereof” that is used in commerce to “identify and 
distinguish” the services of the registrant and to indicate their source. Id. 
65 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012) (prohibiting use of any “word, term, name, symbol, 
or device, or any combination thereof” that is “likely to cause confusion”); id. 
§ 1114(1)(a) (prohibiting infringement of registered trademarks). 
66 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992) (finding “no 
basis for requiring secondary meaning for inherently distinctive trade dress protection 
under [section] 43(a) but not for other distinctive words, symbols, or devices capable of 
identifying a producer’s product”). 
67 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000) (holding that 
“[d]esign, like color, is not inherently distinctive”); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 63, 
§ 8:12.50 (characterizing the Court’s holding in Samara Brothers as a “bright line rule”). 
68 See MCCARTHY, supra note 63, § 8:12.50 (noting that the Supreme Court has 
“created two categories of symbols that always required proof of secondary meaning to 
achieve the status of a protectable mark or trade dress: (1) a single color of a product; and 
(2) the design of a product”). 
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permissible if “the points of resemblance are the necessary result 
of functional requirements.”69 
Even more so than in the genericism context, the common-law 
doctrine of functionality reflected the courts’ concern that trade-
mark protection could be used to illegitimately extend the life of an 
expired patent. In the Shredded Wheat case, which was also instru-
mental in defining the parameters of genericide, the Supreme 
Court discussed the potential conflict between trade dress protec-
tion and the constitutional limits on patent rights: 
The plaintiff has not the exclusive right to sell 
shredded wheat in the form of a pillow-shaped bis-
cuit—the form in which the article became known 
to the public. That is the form in which shredded 
wheat was made under the basic patent. The pa-
tented machines used were designed to produce on-
ly the pillow-shaped biscuits . . . . Hence, upon expi-
ration of the patents the form, as well as the name, 
was dedicated to the public.70 
The Court also recognized that the defendant/competitor Kel-
logg had a right to copy the pillow shape of the biscuit because it 
was “functional.”71 Thus, “the cost of the biscuit would be in-
creased and its high quality lessened if some other form were subs-
tituted for the pillow-shape.”72 Therefore, even in a case not in-
volving an expired patent, the Court recognized that, to preserve 
fair competition, trade dress protection could not prevent competi-
tors from replicating “functional” product features.73 In doing so, 
                                                                                                                            
69 McGill Mfg. Co. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 43 F.2d 607, 608 (E.D.N.Y. 1930); see also 
Lovell-McConnell Mfg. Co. v. Am. Ever-Ready Co., 195 F. 931, 932 (2d Cir. 1912) 
(holding that courts should prevent “imitation in details of construction, with the 
consequent likelihood of confusion . . . unless the points of resemblance are the necessary 
result of an effort to comply with the physical requirements essential to commercial 
success”). 
70 Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119–20 (1938); see also Singer Mfg. 
Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896) (“[A]long with the public ownership of the 
[previously patented] device there must also necessarily pass to the public the generic 
designation of the thing which has arisen during the monopoly in consequence of the 
designation having been acquiesced in by the owner, either tacitly . . . or expressly . . . .”). 
71 Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 122. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
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the Court recognized that, at least in part, the doctrine of functio-
nality was necessary to prevent trademark law from hindering ra-
ther than enhancing fair competition.74 However, just as in the ge-
nericism context, the Court in Kellogg held that the defendant still 
had an obligation to refrain from “passing off or deception,” even 
regarding formerly patented and/or functional product features.75 
The Court found that the defendant, Kellogg, had acted fairly be-
cause it had taken “reasonable precaution to prevent confusion or 
the practice of deception in the sale of its product.”76 
The First Restatement of Torts was published the same year as 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Kellogg.77 Like the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kellogg, the Restatement acknowledged the 
protection of trade dress, tempered by the doctrine of functionali-
ty.78 First, the Restatement recognized the “unprivileged imita-
tion” of the “physical appearance of goods” as a potential basis for 
tort liability, at least as to goods of the same class.79 Such imitation 
would provide a basis for liability only when (1) the relevant prod-
uct features had acquired distinctiveness,80 and (2) defendant’s use 
of those features were “likely to cause prospective purchasers to 
regard his goods as those of the other,” or, in more modern terms, 
likely to cause consumer confusion.81 
Second, the Restatement recognized and defined a doctrine of 
functionality in the context of trade dress protection. According to 
the Restatement, a feature of goods is considered “functional” if it 
“affects their purpose, action or performance, or the facility or 
                                                                                                                            
74 See id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 121–22 (noting that defendant’s “obligation . . . is not to insure that every 
purchaser will know it to be the maker [of the product] but to use every reasonable means 
to prevent confusion”). 
77 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS (AM. LAW INST. 1938). 
78 See id. § 741. 
79 Id. The Restatement noted that “[t]here is a paucity of authority on the question 
whether the interest in the physical appearance of one’s goods is protected against the 
imitation or copy of that appearance on goods of a different class,” and therefore took no 
position on that issue. Id. 
80 The Restatement specifically required “that the copied or imitated feature has 
acquired generally in the market a special significance identifying the other’s goods.” 
§ 741(b). 
81 § 741. 
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economy of processing, handling or using them . . . .”82 This defini-
tion of functionality equates a functional product feature with a uti-
litarian one, without the emphasis on preserving fair competition 
reflected in the Court’s opinion in Kellogg.83 Under this functionali-
ty test, the existence of a “competitive need” for the relevant 
product feature (or lack thereof) has little effect, regardless of 
whether the feature at issue is or was subject to patent protection. 
The Restatement explained that “the shape of a bottle or other 
container may be functional though a different bottle or container 
may hold the goods equally well.”84 However, the impact of the 
exclusion of competitive need from the functionality analysis was 
tempered by the Restatement’s restriction on the use of such func-
tional features. Reflecting existing case law, the Restatement speci-
fied that if a functional product feature had acquired distinctive-
ness, competitors who copied it had a duty to “take reasonable 
steps to inform prospective purchasers that the goods which he 
markets are not those of the other.”85 
Professor Mark Thurmon has characterized this Restatement 
definition of functionality as a “clear break with the prior case 
law,” which had evolved to embrace a more flexible, competitive-
need based analysis of functionality.86 For many years, common 
law courts created and implemented various definitions of functio-
nality that fluctuated between more absolute bars to protection of 
any utilitarian aspect of a device, primarily driven by the courts’ 
desire to avoid conflicts with patent law, to a more flexible “com-
                                                                                                                            
82 Id. § 742. The comment further explains that “[a] feature of goods, or of their 
wrappers or containers, may be functional because it contributes to efficiency or economy 
in manufacturing them or in handling them through the marketing process,” or because it 
“contributes to their utility, to their durability or to the effectiveness or ease with which 
they serve their function or are handled by users.” § 742 cmt. a. 
83 Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938). 
84 § 742 cmt. a. 
85 Id. § 741(b)(2); see also Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 122. 
86 Thurmon, supra note 58, at 275; see also Harold R. Weinberg, Trademark Law, 
Functional Design Features, and the Trouble with TrafFix, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 10–14 
(2001) (characterizing the pre-Restatement period of the functionality doctrine as one 
which emphasized the “economic nature” of the doctrine and considered competitive 
need for the relevant product feature, unlike the view articulated in the Restatement). It is 
unclear why the authors of the Restatement chose to adopt this broader definition of 
functionality. See Weinberg, supra, at 15. 
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petitive need” rationale, focused more on the need to avoid unfair 
competition.87 However, as noted above, because these courts con-
sistently imposed a duty on defendants to refrain from “passing 
off” their goods as those of the plaintiff, plaintiffs in trade dress 
infringement cases were typically entitled to some form of relief in 
such cases, so long as they could prove that their trade dress had 
acquired distinctiveness, and defendant’s copying had led to a like-
lihood of consumer confusion.88 
The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
(“CCPA”), created in 1929, and its 1982 successor, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,89 have played a key role in defin-
ing the doctrine of functionality. The Federal Circuit has jurisdic-
tion over appeals from decisions of the Trademark Trial and Ap-
peal Board (“TTAB”), the administrative court that reviews 
trademark registration decisions from the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office (“USPTO”).90 Given that this federal appellate court 
has the final say in the vast majority of trademark registration dis-
putes, its functionality decisions have been extremely influential 
over the rest of the federal circuits, and remain so today. For ex-
ample, in 1982, the CCPA articulated a decision, In re Morton-
Norwich Products, Inc., which became the cornerstone of the func-
tionality doctrine in federal courts.91 
In Morton-Norwich the CCPA embraced a flexible, competitive-
need-based approach to functionality.92 Under the test adopted by 
the CCPA in this case, courts consider the following factors in de-
termining whether a product feature is functional, and hence un-
                                                                                                                            
87 Thurmon, supra note 58, at 253–82 (examining and describing the common law 
evolution of the functionality doctrine, up to the Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix); 
see also Weinberg, supra note 86, at 9–23. 
88 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
89 The Federal Courts Improvement Act merged the CCPA and the Court of Claims to 
form the Federal Circuit in 1982. Pub. L. No. 97–164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). 
90 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2012). 
91 671 F.2d 1332, 1334 (1982); see also Amy B. Cohen, Following the Direction of TrafFix: 
Trade Dress Law and Functionality Revisited, 50 IDEA 593, 625–27 (2010) (analyzing the 
Morton-Norwich decision). 
92 Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d at 1339 (noting that public policy underlying the 
doctrine does not focus on “the right to slavishly copy articles which are not protected by 
patent or copyright, but the need to copy those articles, which is more properly termed the 
right to compete effectively” (emphasis added)). 
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protectable as a trademark: (1) the existence of an expired utility 
patent disclosing the utilitarian advantage of the applicable de-
sign;93 (2) the existence of advertising by the originator of the de-
sign that “touts its utilitarian advantages”;94 (3) whether a “par-
ticular design results from a comparatively simple or cheap method 
of manufacturing the article”;95 and (4) the availability and appeal 
of alternative designs available to competitors.96 Two of these fac-
tors focus the courts’ attention on the usefulness of the relevant 
product feature by asking whether the party claiming trade dress 
protection has publicized the “utilitarian advantages” of the de-
sign, either in advertising or in the context of an expired utility pa-
tent. The final two factors focus more specifically on the potential 
competitive impact of extending trade dress protection to the de-
sign, considering the design’s impact on cost and quality of manu-
facture and the availability of competitively equivalent alternatives. 
Taken as a whole, the Morton-Norwich factors clearly reflect the 
philosophy that the “right to compete effectively”97 lies at the 
heart of the functionality doctrine. Although two of the factors fo-
cus on the utilitarian nature of the design, they do so in the context 
of identifying the need to copy the design in order to compete ef-
fectively in the market for the relevant product. Utilitarianism, in 
and of itself, does not render a product feature functional under the 
Morton-Norwich factors-based analysis. In fact, the court explicitly 
rejected a definition of functionality that would allow for the pro-
tection of “the design of a particular article . . . as a trademark only 
where the design was useless, that is, wholly unrelated to the func-
tion of the article.”98 The court distinguished between the con-
cepts of de facto functionality, the “lay” definition of functionality 
that is synonymous with utilitarianism, and de jure functionality, a 
                                                                                                                            
93 Id. at 1340–41. 
94 Id. at 1341. 
95 Id.; see also Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938) (noting that the 
cost of defendant’s product “would be increased and its high quality lessened if some 
other form were substituted for the pillow-shape”). 
96 Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d at 1341 (noting that “[s]ince the effect upon 
competition ‘is really the crux of the matter,’ it is, of course, significant that there are 
other alternatives available” (citation omitted)). 
97 Id. at 1339. 
98 Id. at 1338. 
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legal conclusion rendering a design unprotectable as a mark.99 In 
Morton-Norwich, the Federal Circuit sought to create a functionali-
ty doctrine that balanced the need to prevent trade dress infringe-
ment with the right to copy in an effort to preserve fair competi-
tion.100 
Numerous federal courts adopted the Morton-Norwich approach 
to functionality, with its focus on competitive necessity and the 
availability of alternative designs.101 The Third Restatement of Un-
fair Competition, published in 1995, reflected this view, defining a 
“functional” product feature as one that “affords benefits in the 
manufacturing, marketing, or use of the goods or services with 
which the design is used . . . that are important to effective compe-
tition by others and that are not practically available through the 
use of alternative designs.”102 
2.   The Supreme Court’s Modification of the Functionality 
Doctrine 
The Supreme Court first dipped its toe into the functionality 
waters in 1982, the same year the CCPA decided the Morton-
Norwich case. The Court’s decision in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Ives Laboratories, Inc. primarily addressed the doctrine of contribu-
tory trademark infringement.103 However, in a footnote regarding a 
functionality defense that was not addressed in the majority opi-
nion, the Court noted that “[i]n general terms, a product feature is 
functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it 
affects the cost or quality of the article.”104 This footnote did not 
embrace the competitive necessity rationale articulated by the 
CCPA/Federal Circuit and the Third Restatement of Unfair Com-
                                                                                                                            
99 Id. at 1337. 
100 Id. at 1340 (noting the need to “strike a balance between the ‘right to copy’ and the 
right to protect one’s method of trade identification” in the context of the functionality 
doctrine (citation omitted)). 
101 See Thurmon, supra note 58, at 282–96 (describing the evolution of the case law 
during this period). 
102 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). The 
Second Restatement of Torts, which was published in the interim between the First 
Restatement of Torts and the Third Restatement of Unfair Competition, did not address 
this topic. See Thurmon, supra note 58, at 292. 
103 See 456 U.S. 844, 862–63 (1982). 
104 Id. at 850 n.10. 
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petition, because it set up a two-part test that did not mention or 
apparently consider the existence of competitively equivalent al-
ternative designs as part of the functionality analysis.105 However, 
it was properly characterized as dicta by most of the courts that 
considered it and did not have a significant impact on the functio-
nality doctrine.106 
The Supreme Court appeared to clarify its functionality juri-
sprudence, in line with the Federal Circuit’s competitive necessity 
test, in a subsequent opinion, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products 
Co.107 In this case, the Court initially adopted the two-part test 
originally stated in Inwood: “[I]n general terms, a product feature is 
functional, and cannot serve as a trademark, if it is essential to the 
use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the 
article.”108 However, the Court went on to characterize this state-
ment in a way that reflected the competitive necessity rationale, by 
defining a product feature as functional, if the exclusive use of that 
feature “would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-
related disadvantage.”109 Although Qualitex did not mention the 
alternative design factor, it implied that the factor was relevant by 
emphasizing competitive disadvantage as central to the functionali-
ty doctrine.110 If an alternative, competitively equivalent design ex-
ists, a  business will not suffer a “significant non-reputation-related 
disadvantage,” if forced to choose the alternative design over the 
design that acts as a source identifier for its competitor.111 By em-
phasizing the competitive necessity rationale, the Court appeared 
to bring its limited functionality jurisprudence in line with the ex-
tensive development of the doctrine in the lower federal courts, 
particularly the Federal Circuit. 
                                                                                                                            
105 Compare id., with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17. 
106 See, e.g., LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(characterizing the Supreme Court’s functionality definition in Inwood as dictum); 
Cohen, supra note 91, at 627–35 (discussing the lower courts’ treatment of the 
functionality definition stated in Inwood). 
107 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995). 
108 Id. at 165 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Inwood, 456 U.S. at 850 n.10). 
109 Id. 
110 See id. 
111 Id. 
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The relative stability of the federal courts’ functionality juri-
sprudence at this point rendered the impact of the Court’s 2001 
decision in TrafFix all the more surprising. In TrafFix, the Court 
repeated the Inwood two-part test for functionality: A product fea-
ture is functional if (1) it is “essential to the use or purpose of the 
article,” or (2) it “affects the cost or quality of the article.”112 
However, rather than embrace competitive necessity as a funda-
mental underpinning of the doctrine, with its concomitant reliance 
on the availability of alternative designs, the Court rejected it.113 
The Court pronounced that “[w]here the design is functional un-
der the Inwood formulation there is no need to proceed further to 
consider if there is a competitive necessity for the feature.”114 The 
Court went on to reverse the underlying Sixth Circuit decision, 
finding the product feature at issue to be nonfunctional on the 
grounds that the circuit court had given undue weight to the availa-
bility of alternative designs.115 
Many courts and commentators were caught off guard by the 
Court’s decision, given that the Court granted certiorari in TrafFix 
to resolve a circuit split regarding a different issue: whether the ex-
istence of an expired utility patent rendered a product feature func-
tional, a question it declined to answer.116 The question regarding 
the existence of an expired utility patent arose in the lower courts 
because of the concern that the Morton-Norwich analysis did not 
adequately police the boundaries of patent and trademark law,117 
which had long been viewed as a free-standing justification for the 
functionality doctrine itself. The Court, however, explicitly de-
                                                                                                                            
112 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 24 (2001) (quoting 
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165). 
113 Id. at 33. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 33–34. 
116 Id. at 28 (noting that certiorari was granted to resolve a circuit split over the issue of 
“whether the existence of an expired utility patent forecloses the possibility of the 
patentee’s claiming trade dress protection in the product’s design”); id. at 35 (declining 
to resolve the question of whether the “Patent Clause of the Constitution of its own 
force, prohibits the holder of an expired utility patent from claiming trade dress 
protection” (citation omitted)). 
117 See, e.g., Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1507 
(10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the idea that “no patent law purpose is served by allowing 
copying of product configurations that are not necessary to competition”). 
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clined to limit its articulation of the functionality doctrine to cases 
in which the competitive need rationale provoked a conflict with 
the Patent Clause of the Constitution.118 Unlike the Morton-
Norwich four-factor analysis, the TrafFix two-part test makes no 
mention of utility patents.119 The Court reasoned that “[w]hether a 
utility patent has expired or there has been no utility patent at all, a 
product design . . . may be functional because it is ‘essential to the 
use or purpose of the article’ or ‘affects the cost or quality of the 
article.’”120 TrafFix did hold that the existence of an expired utility 
patent created a strong presumption of functionality, but it did so 
because the patent offers proof that the two-part test has been sa-
tisfied.121 The Court’s consideration of utility patents in the con-
text of functionality is therefore primarily grounded in utilitarian-
ism, not the constitutional right to copy. 
Although the Supreme Court in TrafFix seemed to reject the 
relevance of alternative designs in the context of utilitarian func-
tionality doctrine, it did suggest that competitive necessity still 
could determine whether a design or product feature was aestheti-
cally functional. The Court explained that its previous statement—
providing that “a functional feature is one the ‘exclusive use of 
[which] would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-
related disadvantage’”—applied only in cases of aesthetic functio-
nality (the “question involved in Qualitex”).122 The Court in Qua-
litex held that color alone, specifically the green-gold color of dry 
cleaning pads, could (and in that case did) become a source iden-
tifier, and hence a legally protectable trademark.123 Qualitex further 
held that the functionality doctrine did not prohibit the protection 
of color as a form of trade dress under the Lanham Act.124 
                                                                                                                            
118 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 35. 
119 Compare id., with In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340–41 
(C.C.P.A. 1982). 
120 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 35 (emphasis added) (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., 
Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)). 
121 Id. at 29–30 (“A prior patent, we conclude, has vital significance in resolving the 
trade dress claim. A utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are 
functional.”). 
122 Id. at 33 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)). 
123 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162–64. 
124 Id. at 166. 
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The Court in TrafFix therefore created two functionality tests: 
one for cases of utilitarian functionality (in which competitive ne-
cessity and alternative designs would be considered irrelevant), and 
another for cases implicating the aesthetic functionality doctrine 
(where competitive necessity remained central to the doctrine).125 
However, even the facts of Qualitex itself do not neatly fit into the 
aesthetic functionality box created by the Court. The TrafFix 
Court observed that in Qualitex there was “no indication that the 
green-gold color of the laundry press pad had any bearing on the 
use or purpose of the product or its cost or quality.”126 In so ob-
serving, the Court appears not to have carefully considered its own 
prior reasoning. In fact, the Qualitex Court did find that the green-
gold color was utilitarian in the context of a dry cleaning pad: it 
served to avoid “noticeable stains.”127 The color was nonetheless 
determined to be nonfunctional, as the Court found that there was 
“no competitive need in the press pad industry for the green-gold 
color, since other colors [were] equally usable.”128 In other words, 
competitors did not need to copy the green-gold color to hide 
stains on their dry cleaning pads, because other colors would hide 
stains just as well. 
The confusion wrought by the TrafFix decision in the context 
of the functionality doctrine has been well documented.129 The 
federal circuits have split in their interpretations of the rules 
created by TrafFix, especially regarding the relevance, or lack the-
reof, of alternative designs in the context of utilitarian functionali-
ty.130 The Federal Circuit has interpreted the TrafFix opinion nar-
rowly, concluding that the Court’s decision in TrafFix did not fun-
damentally alter the Morton-Norwich four-factor approach to func-
tionality, and, therefore, consideration of alternative designs re-
                                                                                                                            
125 See discussion supra notes 112–15, 122–24. 
126 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33. 
127 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166. 
128 Id. (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., No. CV 90 1183 HLH(JRX), 1991 
WL 318798, *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 1991)). 
129 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 91, at 667; Brett Ira Johnson, Trade Dress Functionality: A 
Doctrine in Need of Clarification, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 125, 130 (2011). 
130 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 91, at 667 (concluding that “the varied approaches to the 
treatment of alternative designs, reflected both in the split in the circuit court as well as 
the decisions of the various district courts [in the wake of TrafFix], is troubling and 
confusing”). 
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mains “properly part of the overall mix” in determining whether a 
product feature should be considered functional in the first in-
stance.131 Other circuits have read the TrafFix decision more broad-
ly and consequently determined that, if a product feature is utilita-
rian—that is, it is “essential to the use or purpose of the article or 
if it affects the cost or quality of the article”—it is functional and 
cannot be protected.132 Thus, “[t]he availability of alternative de-
signs is irrelevant.”133 In applying this test, the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that the party claiming trade dress protection failed to prove 
non-functionality, because it did not show that the relevant product 
feature was an “arbitrary flourish” that served no purpose in the 
underlying product.134 While most courts agree that the availability 
of alternative designs should still be considered in the context of 
aesthetic functionality cases, distinguishing between aesthetic and 
utilitarian functionality cases poses its own problems.135 
The existence of a circuit split on any legal issue creates confu-
sion and uncertainty, and the potential for forum shopping, among 
litigants. In the trademark context, it is particularly disruptive to 
have a difference of opinion between the Federal Circuit, which 
hears all appeals from TTAB registration decisions,136 and its sister 
circuits, which also decide questions of trademark registrability or 
mark validity in the context of infringement lawsuits.137 All parties 
would benefit if the courts could adopt a unified functionality defi-
nition in the wake of TrafFix, or, alternately, if the Court clarified 
its jurisprudence on this issue. 
                                                                                                                            
131 Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also 
McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 756 F.3d 307, 311 (4th Cir. 2014). 
132 Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 
2002) (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001)). 
133 Id. (citing TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33–34); see also Groeneveld Transport Efficiency, Inc. 
v. Lubecore Int’l, Inc., 730 F.3d 494, 506–07 (6th Cir. 2013) (rejecting consideration of 
alternative designs). 
134 Eppendorf, 289 F.3d at 357–58. 
135 See Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distrib., 369 F.3d 1197, 1203–04 & n.7 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (holding ice cream color to be functional under both utilitarian and aesthetic 
analyses); Baughman Tile Co. v. Plastic Tubing, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 720, 722 n.2 
(E.D.N.C. 2002) (applying utilitarian functionality doctrine analysis to determine 
whether the color of plastic tubing should be considered functional). 
136 28 U.S.C § 1295(a)(4)(B) (2012). 
137 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (2012). 
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3.   The Current Status of Functionality Under the Lanham Act 
The doctrine of functionality, like the genericism doctrine, has 
increased in importance due to the elevated significance of trade-
mark registration and the expansion of trademark protection gener-
ally under the Lanham Act. However, unlike genericism, which 
appeared as a bar to registration in the original version of the Lan-
ham Act passed in 1948, Congress did not codify the functionality 
doctrine until fifty years later in 1998.138 Like generic words or 
phrases, the current version of the Lanham Act excludes functional 
aspects of product design from protection.139 A functional design 
may not be registered as a trademark, even if it is has acquired dis-
tinctiveness.140 If registered, it may be canceled at any time, even if 
it is encompassed within a mark that would otherwise be consi-
dered incontestable.141 To state a claim for infringement of unregis-
tered trade dress under the Lanham Act, the plaintiff has the bur-
den of proving “that the matter sought to be protected is not func-
tional.”142 However, the Lanham Act does not define the word 
“functional.” Instead, the courts have attempted to do so, as de-
scribed above.143 Moreover, the Lanham Act—unlike the common 
law—does not provide “functional” product features with a li-
mited degree of protection,  even if they have acquired secondary 
meaning.144 As both the Lanham Act and common law have em-
braced product design as a form of trademark, and the significance 
of the protections extended to trademarks has increased, it has be-
come even more important to have a clear, workable functionality 
doctrine designed to preserve and protect fair competition. 
                                                                                                                            
138 Technical Corrections to Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 105-330, 112 Stat. 
3069 (1998); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 63, § 7:63. 
139 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2012). 
140 See id. (barring registration of any putative mark that “comprises any matter that, as 
a whole, is functional”). Functional product features may not be registered with a 
showing of acquired distinctiveness. See § 1052(f). 
141 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(8) (2012). (providing that an incontestable mark may be 
subject to the defense that it is functional); id. § 1064(3) (providing that a mark may be 
cancelled “[a]t any time if the registered mark . . . is functional”). 
142 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2012). 
143 See supra notes 103–35 and accompanying text. 
144 See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text. 
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II.   GENERICISM AND FUNCTIONALITY: COMMON THEMES 
FOR REFORM 
Over the years, the genericism and functionality doctrines have 
evolved, both in their significance and in their obtuseness. Flexible, 
common-law principles of unfair competition have given way to 
more formalistic, bright-line rules, especially as these rules have 
been codified and federalized. Rather than enhance predictability, 
however, these rules have had the opposite effect. Moreover, in 
adopting an all-or-nothing approach to trademarks deemed generic 
or functional, the courts have, in various respects, tolerated or even 
enabled some degree of consumer confusion, which injures both 
competitors and the public. By reorienting the doctrines towards 
their common-law roots, courts can improve outcomes and, per-
haps more importantly, enhance consistency and predictability as 
courts attempt to mark the boundaries of trademark law. 
A. Redefining and Simplifying Genericism and Functionality 
The tests developed by the courts to address the issues of gene-
ricism and functionality have proven difficult to apply and have 
drawn the doctrines away from their original purpose: to ensure 
free and fair competition.145 In doing so, these doctrines have unin-
tentionally imposed costs on consumers as well. By refocusing the 
doctrines on the core ideal of free and fair competition, courts can 
simplify the doctrines and achieve more consistent and predictable 
results, to the benefit of competitors and consumers alike.  
1. Refocusing Genericism on the Primary Significance Test 
In the genericism context, the court’s analysis of whether a 
putative mark is functioning as a source identifier when consumers 
are using it in a commercial setting should answer the question of 
whether the putative mark is deemed generic in the vast majority of 
cases. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Kellogg emphasized that a 
valid trademark exists when “the primary significance of the term in 
the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the pro-
ducer.”146 The Court recognized that words or terms can have dual 
                                                                                                                            
145 See supra notes 42–49, 129–35 and accompanying text. 
146 Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (emphasis added). 
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meanings—one generic and one not—at the same time; the ques-
tion is which definition predominates in the minds of consumers.147 
The Court found that, under the facts of that case, any source-
identifying significance retained by the Shredded Wheat mark had 
become a “subordinate meaning” of the term.148 Therefore, the 
term was no longer protectable as a trademark. 
As the author and Deven Desai have previously argued, courts 
have both over-simplified and unnecessarily complicated this anal-
ysis.149 The various tests developed by the courts to ferret out ge-
neric words—e.g., genus/species, who-are-you, what-are-you—
attempt to put words into neat categorical boxes, without suffi-
ciently taking into account the context in which they are being used 
and perceived by consumers. Many, if not most, words in the Eng-
lish language have multiple meanings. Outside the confines of 
trademark law, such linguistic flexibility is rarely considered prob-
lematic, because meaning is determined from context. For exam-
ple, if the word “snow” were to be used in casual conversation, the 
listener would be able to tell whether the speaker intended to refer-
ence (1) frozen precipitation, (2) a dessert, (3) cocaine, or (4) to 
deceive, all of which are dictionary definitions of the word 
“snow.”150 However, if an erstwhile trademark co-exists with an 
alternative, generic meaning of the same word, courts and the Pa-
tent and Trademark Office are quick to point to that alternative 
meaning as evidence that the word (or words) cannot be a trade-
mark. 
Courts therefore over-rely on evidence derived from dictiona-
ries, newspapers, and the like to prove the death or nonexistence of 
a trademark: 
Dictionary entries and media uses certainly may re-
flect some of the ways in which a term is used. 
These noncommercial uses of a trademark are, 
however, poor barometers of the consumer’s per-
ception of the mark in commercial contexts and—
unlike competitive misuse of the mark—they do not 
                                                                                                                            
147 See id. 
148 Id. 
149 See Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1836. 
150 See id. at 1838–39. 
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necessarily affect consumer perceptions in commer-
cial settings.151 
In truth, this type of evidence proves little other than the fact 
that the putative trademark also has a non-trademark meaning as-
sociated with it. The court’s primary task, in such cases, is to de-
termine whether the “generic” meaning of the term is primary or 
subordinate, when viewed by consumers in a commercial setting. 
Over-relying on noncommercial uses of a mark as evidence of 
genericism also has the pernicious effect of undermining the fair 
use doctrine. Particularly as applied to words or terms that may 
otherwise be considered descriptive, it should be obvious that such 
terms would appear in the lexicon in their non-trademark sense. 
Indeed, the descriptive fair use doctrine presumes that such uses 
will occur and shields them from a claim of trademark infringe-
ment.152 However, by pointing to such uses as indicative of the 
term’s invalidity as a mark, the genericism doctrine indirectly in-
centivizes trademark holders to “police” uses of their marks that 
should be considered fair. This type of over-enforcement of trade-
mark rights may lead to trademark bullying or at least the percep-
tion of it, which imposes its own set of costs on society.153 
2. Rationalizing Functionality  
As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s rewriting of the func-
tionality doctrine has been widely criticized.154 In TrafFix, the 
Court expanded the definition of a functional product feature, un-
mooring the doctrine from its underpinnings in the law of unfair 
competition. TrafFix arguably reoriented functionality by redirect-
ing courts’ attention away from the competitive impact of extend-
ing trade dress protection to a product feature, and instead focus-
                                                                                                                            
151 Id. at 1836. 
152 See, e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 
123 (2004) (holding that, while descriptive fair use is not defeated by a showing of 
likelihood of confusion, the degree of confusion may be pertinent to whether defendant’s 
use of the plaintiff’s mark is fair); Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores 
Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2010) (defining and applying descriptive 
fair use doctrine). 
153 See generally Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625 
(2011). 
154 See supra note 129. 
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ing their attention on the question of whether the trade dress at is-
sue should be considered utilitarian. It also created an illusory dis-
tinction between aesthetic functionality cases, in which the Court 
still permits application of competitive necessity rationale, and uti-
litarian ones, which, as explained above, now appear to exclude this 
type of analysis.155 The doctrine should be redirected toward its 
pro-competitive roots. 
In considering whether a product feature or design should be 
considered functional, a court’s primary focus should be a relative-
ly simple one: Will limiting the ability of competitors to use this 
product feature negatively impact their ability to fairly compete in 
the market for this product? The Morton-Norwich factors, slightly 
reconfigured, are relevant in answering this basic question: (1) does 
this design feature make this product work, or make it work bet-
ter?156 (2) would the producer incur additional cost if forced to 
eliminate or alter this design feature? and (3) does this design fea-
ture make the product appeal to consumers in a way that is not re-
lated to its source-identifying function? A positive response to any 
of these questions should create a presumption of functionality, 
because restricting the right to copy any such product feature could 
unfairly hinder free and fair competition. However, that presump-
tion should be rebuttable: If the design feature does confer some 
benefit in terms of the product’s function or appeal to consumers, 
are there equally attractive means that can be used to achieve the 
same result, without imposing additional costs? If so, the competi-
tor should choose one of those alternatives, to avoid creating 
a likelihood of consumer confusion, assuming that the plaintiff has 
proven both acquired distinctiveness of the product design and  
likelihood of confusion. In applying this test, a court should be able 
to determine whether a product feature is functional in the vast ma-
jority of cases. 
However, as discussed more thoroughly below, the need to 
avoid conflict with patent law requires consideration of a final 
                                                                                                                            
155 See discussion supra notes 112–15 and 122–24. 
156 One factor emphasized by the Morton-Norwich court was whether the party claiming 
trade dress protection of a product design had advertised the utilitarian benefits of that 
design. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1338–41 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
Such advertising would constitute proof and/or an admission that such benefits existed. 
724         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:691 
 
question in some functionality cases.157 Many, if not most, product 
designs that function as trade dress are not the subject of an ex-
pired utility patent;158 as to these types of designs, there is no direct 
conflict with patent law. Moreover, if a design feature was formerly 
covered by a utility patent, it will, in most cases, make the product 
work, or work better in some respect, thereby conferring a compet-
itive advantage on the patent holder. In these types of cases, the 
analysis described above will render the product feature functional, 
thereby again avoiding a direct conflict with patent law. However, 
it is possible that a patented design feature (or one claim within a 
patent) may have no utilitarian impact on the underlying product 
or otherwise impact competition in the manner described above. In 
such cases, the court should directly examine whether extending 
trade dress protection would effectively extend the patent monopo-
ly: Would it prevent competitors from copying the previously pa-
tented device? If so, the product feature may be deemed functional 
for this reason as well, without consideration of alternative de-
signs.159 
One benefit of this unified definition is that it eliminates the 
need for courts to attempt to distinguish between instances of utili-
tarian and aesthetic functionality. Aesthetic aspects of product de-
sign—as in the case of the color of the dry-cleaning pads in Quali-
tex, discussed above160—often serve a utilitarian purpose as well as 
a source-identifying function. Courts should not discount or ignore 
the source-identifying capacity of a product feature merely because 
it is simultaneously utilitarian. By doing so, they potentially impose 
costs on consumers and business owners by enabling a defendant to 
pass off his goods as those of the plaintiff. 
                                                                                                                            
157 See infra notes 191–253 and accompanying text. 
158 See infra notes 194–99 and accompanying text. 
159 This recommendation for reform essentially follows the reasoning of the Tenth 
Circuit in Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 
1995), a case that preceded the Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix. In Vornado, the 
Tenth Circuit held that “where a disputed product configuration is part of a claim in a 
utility patent, and the configuration is a described, significant inventive aspect of the 
invention . . . so that without it the invention could not fairly be said to be the same 
invention, patent law prevents its protection as trade dress, even if the configuration is 
nonfunctional.” Id. at 1510. 
160 See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text. 
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Moreover, by restricting trade dress protection to those prod-
uct features that exist only as an “arbitrary flourish,”161 the func-
tionality doctrine intrudes upon and merges with the doctrine of 
inherent distinctiveness. Some forms of trade dress may be consi-
dered inherently distinctive, and the test for determining whether 
they satisfy that standard sounds remarkably similar to the defini-
tion of functionality adopted by many federal courts post-
TrafFix.162 This merger of standards is doubly confusing, given that 
the Supreme Court has held that the forms of trade dress most typ-
ically associated with the functionality doctrine—color and product 
design—can never be considered inherently distinctive, even if 
they are, in fact, arbitrary and serve no utilitarian purpose.163 
Like word marks, features of trade dress may serve a dual func-
tion in practice and in the mind of the consumer. To the consumer, 
they may simultaneously have a utilitarian purpose and act as a 
source identifier. In determining which function predominates (or, 
to borrow word mark terminology, the primary significance of the 
mark), a court must necessarily consider whether alternatives to 
the relevant product feature are available to the competitor and are 
truly equal to their source-identifying counterpart. However, as 
                                                                                                                            
161 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001); Eppendorf-
Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 357 (5th Cir. 2002). 
162 The term “arbitrary” is frequently used by courts when attempting to define 
inherently distinctive trade dress.  The case most frequently cited and relied upon by 
other courts in making this determination, Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd., 
uses the term “arbitrary” as though it were synonymous with “distinctive” in this 
context. See 568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (“In determining whether a design is 
arbitrary or distinctive this court has looked to . . . [various factors.]”); see also Paddington 
Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 584 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that, 
because product packaging was “undeniably arbitrary,” it was inherently distinctive and 
did not require proof of secondary meaning to be protectable); Chevron Chem. Co. v. 
Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1981) (reasoning that “[i]f 
the features of the trade dress sought to be protected are arbitrary and serve no function 
either to describe the product or assist in its effective packaging,” the trade dress should 
be considered inherently distinctive). 
163 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000) (holding that 
“[d]esign, like color, is not inherently distinctive”); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 
514 U.S. 159, 162–63 (1995) (analogizing color to a descriptive word mark, which is 
protectable only if it develops secondary meaning over time); see also MCCARTHY, supra 
note 63, § 8:12.50 (noting that the Supreme Court has “created two categories of symbols 
that always required proof of secondary meaning to achieve the status of a protectable 
mark or trade dress: (1) a single color of a product; and (2) the design of a product”). 
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discussed below, when trademark protection of such product fea-
tures collides directly with the policies underlying the Patent and 
Copyright Clause of the Constitution, trademark law must yield.164 
Therefore, if trade dress protection is sought for a product feature 
that is a “described, significant inventive aspect”165 of an expired 
utility patent, competitors should not be required to adopt alterna-
tive designs. 
B. The Patent Dilemma and the Importance of Alternatives 
One policy justification for both the genericism and functionali-
ty doctrines lies within the constitutional authorization for a differ-
ent form of intellectual property: patents. The Constitution enables 
Congress to grant an inventor an “exclusive [r]ight” to her disco-
veries for “limited [t]imes,” for the purpose of promoting “the 
useful [a]rts.”166 Trademarks are not subject to the time limitation 
that is constitutionally imposed on a patent, and therefore they may 
last in perpetuity, so long as the mark at issue continues to be 
used.167 The heart of the potential conflict between patent and 
trademark law lies in this temporal disparity. The Supreme Court 
has held that a patent owner cannot evade the statutory and consti-
tutional time limit on a patent by recasting his invention as a form 
of trade dress protected under the auspices of trademark law.168 
Both the genericism and functionality doctrines exist, in part, to 
police this boundary between patents and trademarks. This Article 
argues, however, that this policing function is implicated in only a 
minority of cases raising issues of genericism and functionality. 
Even in that context, if the functionality and genericism doctrines 
focus on preserving fair competition, they will simultaneously ad-
                                                                                                                            
164 See infra notes 219–26 and accompanying text. 
165 Vornado Air Circulation Sys, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1510 (10th Cir. 
1995). 
166 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
167 Under the Lanham Act, a federal trademark registration does not expire after a set 
period of time. The Act requires the owner of a federally registered mark to file a renewal 
application with the USPTO attesting to the continued use of the mark in commerce and 
to pay a specified fee every ten years. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058–1059 (2012).  If the mark owner 
fulfils these obligations, the mark may theoretically last in perpetuity. 
168 See Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v. 
June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896). 
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here to the limitations of patent monopolies—at least in the vast 
majority of cases. 
1. The Link Between Expired Patents and Genericide 
The genericism doctrine, which almost exclusively applies to 
word marks, is not often considered critical or even relevant to the 
patent/trademark boundary discussed above. However, some of 
the earliest examples of genericide—the process by which a valid 
trademark loses its source-identifying significance and becomes a 
generic word—arose from cases involving expired utility patents. 
When the patent expires on an invention, the ability to exploit that 
patent may be thwarted if the trademark used to identify it has 
evolved to signify the generic product rather than the brand. In 
such cases, the trademark is rendered invalid via genericide, thus 
enabling competitors to copy it, much like the expired patent itself. 
Competitive necessity compels this result as well. The existence 
and promotion of an alternative, generic name for the goods pro-
duced under the patent may resolve both the conflict with patent 
law and the anticompetitive effects of trademark protection in this 
scenario, thus avoiding the genericide of the mark.169 
A classic genericide case, Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co. exempli-
fies the link between genericide of a trademark and expiration of an 
underlying patent.170 In Bayer, the manufacturer of a drug sold un-
der the trademark Aspirin proffered the alternative term “acetyl 
salicylic acid” as an alternative to the trademark.171 Perhaps not 
surprisingly, this “extraordinary collocation of letters,”172 in the 
words of Judge Learned Hand, did not catch on. Judge Hand found 
that consumers did not understand the word “aspirin” to mean 
“anything more than a kind of drug,” despite the manufacturer’s 
                                                                                                                            
169 Trademark attorney Jerre Swann argued in 1999 (pre-TrafFix) that genericism 
should take a page from the functionality playbook and similarly put the availability of 
alternatives at the center of the doctrine rather than on the periphery. See Jerre B. Swann, 
Genericism Rationalized, 89 TRADEMARK REP. 639, 650 (1999). 
170 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
171 Id. at 510. 
172 Id. Judge Learned Hand’s colorful description actually referred to an alternative 
name for the drug, “monoaceticacidester of salicylic acid,” but it captured the essence of 
both generic names for the drug. Id. 
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belated efforts to infuse it with source-identifying significance.173 
The court further found that consumers did not understand “aspi-
rin” and “acetyl salicylic acid” to be the same drug.174 Because the 
word “aspirin” did not retain any source-identifying significance, 
it was not entitled to protection as a trademark.175 
The problem faced by the drug manufacturer in Bayer is not 
unique. The inventor who creates and patents a unique product 
may effectively “fall victim to [his] own success” when he at-
tempts to obtain or maintain trademark protection for the name of 
his product, after the patent has expired.176 If there is only one 
source for a particular good or service, then the mark that identifies 
the source may also become the word that identifies the thing it-
self.177 Under these circumstances, competitors who wish to copy 
and exploit the formerly patented invention may need to label their 
copies with the same trademark used by the inventor, because the 
public understands nothing else.178 
                                                                                                                            
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1820 (alteration in original). 
177 Id. at 1820–21 (“Because the trademark/patent holder enjoys a monopoly over the 
production of the good during the patent period, the trademark label placed on the good 
typically serves a dual function: to identify the sole source of the good (i.e., the trademark 
holder) and to identify the good itself. When the patent period ends, consumers continue 
to identify the good by using the trademark.”). 
178 But see Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of 
Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1502–04 (2002). Parchomovsky and Siegelman 
wrote that Singer Manufacutring Co. v. June Manufacturing Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896), and 
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938), held that “the generic name by 
which a patented invention has become known falls into the public domain at the 
expiration of the patent.” Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra, at 1502. They critiqued this 
holding, based on an economic theory of leveraged patents, as failing to recognize and 
maximize the benefits of allowing an inventor to enjoy trademark protection after the 
expiration of a patent. Id. at 1503–04.  
Parchomovsky and Siegelman’s economic analysis arguably does not accurately 
distinguish between generic names and non-generic marks in terms of the economic value 
of post-patent trademark protections. Genericide, as explained above, is not an 
unavoidable consequence of patent protection. However, when it does occur, 
competitors’ ability to exploit the expired patent may be severely compromised if the 
generic name is protected as a trademark, negatively impacting the market for the 
formerly patented product and, consequently, the consumers who buy it. Trademark law, 
therefore, should distinguish between marks that have become generic names and those 
that have not, particularly in cases involving expired patents. 
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The genericide of trademarks associated with expired utility pa-
tents is not, however, inevitable. So long as a viable alternative to 
the trademarked name exists, neither patent law nor the law of un-
fair competition requires the invalidation of the trademark. A viable 
alternative exists when consumers can and do use alternative words 
to identify the good or service at issue, other than the trademark. 
As a result, patent holders should strive to develop and adapt 
workable, alternative names for their patented inventions (assum-
ing they do not already exist), in addition to selecting a viable 
trademark for the purpose of identifying and marketing their inven-
tions. If they fail to do so, they may fall victim to their own success, 
as described above. Admittedly, even if an alternative name exists, 
the trademark owner may not be able to convince the public to use 
it. The trademark owner can, however, increase the chances of 
success in this regard by (1) using the name itself, in conjunction 
with the trademark, in identifying its own goods or services, and 
(2) choosing an alternative generic name that is not lengthy or dif-
ficult to pronounce, spell, or remember.179 
Trademarks can fall victim to genericide, of course, in cases 
that do not involve expired patents. Similarly, consumers’ access 
to viable alternatives (or lack thereof) should play a critical role in 
any genericism determination; the significance of alternative mo-
nikers, from a competitive standpoint, is or should not be limited to 
cases involving expired patents. A patent imparts a legal monopoly 
that creates a finite period of market dominance. For the reasons 
stated above, that monopoly can erode the source-identifying signi-
ficance of a trademark. The same phenomenon may occur outside 
the patent context, when market dominance occurs for other rea-
sons, such as superior quality of product or effective marketing. 
Unlike the case involving a utility patent, in this context the trade-
mark holder enjoys market dominance solely due to her own com-
mercial success. Here as well, the genericide doctrine prevents 
trademark law from artificially suppressing competition. Just as in 
the case of a formerly patented product, if the public equates the 
trademark with the thing itself, competitors should be allowed to 
                                                                                                                            
179 Bayer’s proffered alternatives to the trademark Aspirin—“acetyl salicylic acid” or 
“monoaceticacidester of salicylicacid”—would not satisfy this standard. Bayer, 272 F. at 
510. 
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use the name that the public understands. Again, alternatives are 
key: If no alternative name exists as a viable substitute for the puta-
tive trademark, then competitive necessity may require the denial 
of trademark protection, as consumers may recognize no other 
name as referring to the good or service in question. 
There are numerous examples of trademark/generic combina-
tions that are concurrently recognized by consumers, allowing the 
trademark holder to retain the source-identifying significance of its 
mark, despite enjoying a period of market dominance. For example, 
consumers recognize the word “Google” as the name of one of the 
most successful companies in the world.180 Google is, of course, a 
federally registered trademark.181 In 2016, Forbes estimated the 
value of Google brand at over $82.5 billion.182 However, the Google 
trademark was recently challenged, and its cancellation sought, on 
the grounds that it was generic.183 In so doing, the plaintiff argued 
that “a majority of the public understands the word google, when 
used as a verb, to mean the indiscriminate act of searching the In-
ternet without regard to the search engine used.”184 The court cor-
rectly found that, even though some portion of the public does use 
the word “google” in this manner, this usage of the mark does not 
demonstrate that it has become generic.185 To determine the pri-
mary significance of the word “google,” the court correctly fo-
cused on the “use and understanding of the mark in the context of 
purchasing decisions.”186 
Even if a majority of the public used the word “google” in the 
manner described by the plaintiff, the result would not necessarily 
be genericide, so long as the majority of the public also recognizes 
that Google is a specific, highly effective search engine.187 Con-
                                                                                                                            
180 See The World’s Most Valuable Brands, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/powerful-
brands/list/ [https://perma.cc/2T7K-WT3Y] (last visited Mar. 31, 2017). 
181 GOOGLE, Registration No. 4,525,914. 
182 See The World’s Most Valuable Brands, supra note 180. 
183 Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1161 (D. Ariz. 2014), appeal docketed, No. 
15-15809 (9th Cir. Apr. 22, 2015). 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 1173–75. 
186 Id. at 1162 (quoting 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 63, § 12:8); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
187 Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1173 (discussing survey evidence and expert opinions). 
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sumers’ concurrent generic use of the term signifies Google’s do-
minance of the search engine market, not the collapse of its trade-
mark validity.188 Unlike the term “acetyl salicylic acid” in Bayer, 
which was meaningless to the average consumer,189 the term 
“search engine” is used and understood by consumers who also 
identify Google as a particular search engine.190 Consumers would 
be confused and misled if Yahoo and Bing labeled themselves 
“Google” or invited consumers to “Google” on their search en-
gines. Neither the competitive market for search engines nor the 
integrity of the patent system would be improved by allowing 
Google’s competitors to use its name in this manner. 
Therefore, although genericide does play a role in policing the 
boundary between trademark and patent law, that function is sub-
sidiary to the doctrine’s broader competitive focus. Any trademark 
may need to be invalidated on grounds of genericism if the public 
recognizes no other name as identifying the good or service to 
which it is attached. Otherwise competitors are unfairly tongue-
tied in marketing their wares. The patent monopoly creates the 
perfect conditions for this type of market impact, but the generi-
cide phenomenon is not limited to cases involving expired utility 
patents. Whenever a trademark holder enjoys a period of market 
dominance—engendered by either a federally-enforced patent mo-
nopoly or the fruits of her own commercial success—she needs to 
ensure that consumers can understand and use some name other 
than her trademark to refer to the good or service at issue. Without 
a viable alternative, the trademark will cease to function as such. 
2. Patents and Functionality 
Much more so than the genericism doctrine, the functionality 
principle has traditionally been viewed by courts and commenta-
tors alike as a bulwark between trade dress protection, under both 
the Lanham Act and the common law, and the bounds of federal 
patent law. This Section argues that, to some degree, this aspect of 
                                                                                                                            
188 See Laura A. Heymann, The Grammar of Trademarks, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
1313, 1348 (2010) (noting that use of a trademark as a verb may be an indication of brand 
strength and “enduring fame” rather than genericism). 
189 See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
190 See Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1173–75. 
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the functionality doctrine has been overstated. Moreover, a func-
tionality doctrine primarily aimed at preserving a level competitive 
playing field will almost always protect the legal space that has been 
carved out, both legislatively and constitutionally, for patents. 
The Supreme Court described the patent/trademark conflict, 
and functionality’s role in resolving it, in Qualitex: 
It is the province of patent law, not trademark law, 
to encourage invention by granting inventors a mo-
nopoly over new product designs or functions for a 
limited time, after which competitors are free to use 
the innovation. If a product’s functional features 
could be used as trademarks, however, a monopoly 
over such features could be obtained without regard 
to whether they qualify as patents and could be ex-
tended forever (because trademarks may be re-
newed in perpetuity).191 
Qualitex identified two problems associated with extending 
trade dress protection to functional product features, vis-à-vis pa-
tent law: (1) functional product features that satisfy the require-
ments of patentability should not be accorded protection for an un-
limited period of time, because the Constitution specifies that pa-
tent monopolies may be extended only for “limited times”; and (2) 
functional product features that do not satisfy the requirements of 
patentability should not be accorded monopolistic protections that 
are constitutionally reserved for patents.192 
If trade dress protection effectively results in extending the life 
of a utility patent, the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitu-
tion193 requires that trade dress law step aside to allow the patent to 
fully fall into the public domain, regardless of whether alternative 
designs would achieve the same result from a competitive stand-
point. However, outside this relatively narrow circumstance, the 
need to avoid a conflict with patent law should not require the ab-
andonment of a pro-competitive approach to the doctrine of func-
tionality, including the consideration of alternative designs. If non-
                                                                                                                            
191 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164–65 (1995) (citation omitted). 
192 Id. 
193 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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patented forms of trade dress are ineligible for trademark protec-
tion due to their functionality, the justification for the application 
of the doctrine lies in the preservation of fair competition, rather 
than a tenuous or, in some cases, non-existent conflict with patent 
law. 
The overriding principle that trademark law does not—or at 
least should not—extend a patent-like monopoly to the holder of 
the trademark should inform all aspects of the functionality doc-
trine. Precisely because its roots are lodged in the common law of 
unfair competition, outside the constitutional grounding of both 
patent and copyright laws, trademark law provides a more limited 
form of protection that serves to enable free competition and pro-
tect consumers, rather than inspire invention and creativity. The 
limits of trademark law are key to maintaining the constitutional 
balance between trademarks and patents.  
a)   The Constitutional Limits of Patent Preemption 
The Qualitex Court correctly observed that many product fea-
tures considered “functional” would not satisfy the statutory con-
ditions for patentability.194 In fact, the vast majority of product fea-
tures that may be considered “functional” trade dress would not 
clear the patentability hurdle. As noted above, TrafFix defined a 
functional product feature as one that is “essential to the use or 
purpose of the article” or “affects the cost or quality of the ar-
ticle.”195 A patented device similarly must be “useful,”196 but it 
must satisfy other requirements as well. It must also be “novel”—
that is, the claimed invention must not be “patented, described in a 
printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available 
to the public” before the patent application is filed.197 The claimed 
                                                                                                                            
194 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164–65. 
195 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 24 (2001) (quoting 
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165). 
196 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (providing that patents may be obtained for a “new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof,” provided other statutory requirements are met); see also In re ‘318 
Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1324–27 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (analyzing statutory 
utility requirement and concluding that it was not met). 
197 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012); see also In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (defining novelty requirement for patentability). 
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invention also must not have been “obvious” to one of “ordinary 
skill in the art” to which the invention pertains, prior to the patent 
filing date.198 Finally, the invention must be described in the patent 
application, such that one of ordinary skill in the art could make 
and use it.199 None of these requirements apply to useful forms of 
trade dress that may be deemed functional. Therefore, the range of 
product features that may be considered functional trade dress ex-
tends far beyond the limits of federal patent protection. 
Qualitex identified this difference in scope as a policy consider-
ation justifying the functionality doctrine itself: utilitarian product 
features should not be protected under trademark law, because to 
do so would confer upon them monopolistic protection that is con-
stitutionally reserved for patents.200 In Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc., the Supreme Court embraced an even broader con-
cept of patent preemption, articulating a bright-line rule that would 
place all forms of product design outside the reach of trademark 
law: 
[W]hen an article is unprotected by a patent or a 
copyright, state law may not forbid others to copy 
that article. To forbid copying would interfere with 
the federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the 
Constitution and in the implementing federal sta-
tutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the 
federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public 
domain.201 
                                                                                                                            
198 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). Obviousness is determined based on “(1) the scope and 
content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the claims and the prior art; (3) the 
level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective considerations of nonobviousness.” 
OSRAM Sylvania, Inc. v. Am. Induction Techs., Inc., 701 F.3d 698, 706 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)). 
199 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); see also SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 
1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (discussing this requirement). 
200 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164–65. 
201 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 
231 (1964) (“An unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is in 
the public domain and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so.”). Professor 
Mark McKenna summarized this position as follows:  
[F]eatures that are within the subject matter of patent law . . . fall 
outside of trademark law’s reach not because of the consequences of 
trademark protection for particular competitors, but to preserve the 
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The Court specified that, even if a product design was nonfunc-
tional and had acquired secondary meaning, state law could not 
forbid copying it, even if consumer confusion was likely to result.202 
Twenty-five years later, the Court took a more nuanced view of 
the interrelationship between federal patent law and state unfair 
competition law in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.203 
Although the Court in Bonito Boats recognized that its opinions in 
Compco and its companion case, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 
spoke “in absolutist terms” regarding a constitutional right to 
copy, it rejected the idea that federal patent law ipso facto 
preempted “all state regulation of potentially patentable but unpa-
tented subject matter.”204 Instead the Court favored a “pragmatic 
approach” to the preemption issue, noting that “[s]tate law is not 
displaced merely because the contract relates to intellectual prop-
erty which may or may not be patentable; the states are free to re-
gulate the use of such intellectual property in any manner not in-
consistent with federal law.”205 
In procedural terms, the Court’s reasoning shifted from a broad 
notion of field preemption to conflict preemption. Field preemp-
tion exists when “the federal interest [in the field] is so dominant 
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of 
state laws on the same subject.”206 Conflict preemption exists 
when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or 
where the state law precludes the “accomplishment and execution 
                                                                                                                            
broader structure of the intellectual property system. [F]reedom to 
copy [is] the background legal rule to which patent law operates as a 
carefully circumscribed exception. 
Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823, 834 (2011). 
202 Compco, 376 U.S. at 238. The Court noted that, in such cases, state law could require 
precautions such as labeling to prevent confusion, but could not prohibit copying itself. Id. 
For a discussion of intermediate remedies provided to prevent confusion in the copying of 
functional product features, see infra text accompanying notes 302–09. 
203 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
204 Id. at 154 (citing Sears, Roebuck, 376 U.S. at 232). 
205 Id. at 156 (quoting Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979)). 
206 Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 115 (3d Cir. 2010). A federal law may also 
expressly preempt a state one when Congress says that it intends to displace state law on a 
given issue, in the text of the federal statute itself. See Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated 
Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985); Farina, 625 F.3d at 115. The Patent Act does 
not include language indicating such an intent. 
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of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” as expressed in 
the federal statute.207 In Bonito Boats, the court invalidated a Flori-
da state law that prohibited the duplication of boat hull designs on 
the grounds that the statute granted rights “similar in scope and 
operation to the rights accorded [under federal patent law],” while 
exceeding many of its limitations.208 The Florida law undermined 
the purpose and objectives of the federal patent scheme. The Court 
distinguished the Florida statute from state laws prohibiting unfair 
competition and theft of trade secrets, both of which the Court 
characterized as peacefully co-existing with federal patent law.209 
In each of these decisions—Compco, Sears Roebuck, and Bonito 
Boats—the Supreme Court interpreted the scope of federal patent 
law preemption, vis-à-vis a conflicting state statute. None of these 
cases interpreted the Lanham Act, the federal statute that domi-
nates trademark law today. Moreover, none of these cases directly 
                                                                                                                            
207 Farina, 625 F.3d at 115 (citing Hillsborough Cty., 471 U.S. at 713). 
208 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 158. The Court noted that the Florida law offered boat hull 
manufacturers monopolistic protection for their designs for an unlimited number of years, 
“without regard to their ornamental or technological merit.” Id. at 158–59; see also id. at 
144–45 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 559.94 (1987)). 
209 See id. at 155–56 (discussing state trade secret laws); id. at 157–58 (discussing unfair 
competition law). The Court had previously upheld state laws prohibiting theft of trade 
secrets, rejecting the claim that these laws were preempted by federal patent law. See 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974). State right of publicity laws 
have also raised preemption issues in the context of federal copyright law. Although the 
Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, most of the federal courts that have 
considered it have similarly found that right of publicity laws are not preempted by the 
federal Copyright Act. See, e.g., Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1003–05 
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff’s right of publicity claim was not preempted by 
federal copyright law, on the grounds that the subject matter protected by the respective 
statutes (persona versus work of authorship) were dissimilar); Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 
654, 658 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that a “persona does not fall within the subject matter of 
copyright—it does not consist of a ‘writing’ of an ‘author’ within the meaning of the 
Copyright Clause of the Constitution” (citation omitted)). But see Maloney v. T3Media, 
Inc., 853 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that plaintiff’s right-of-publicy claim was 
preempted by the Copyright Act). However, commentators have raised concerns about 
the intrusion of right of publicity and other state statutes into the realm of copyright law. 
See generally Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of the Preemption Provision of the 
Copyright Act of 1976, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1 (2007) (arguing for expanded 
preemption of state law claims under the Copyright Act); Jennifer E. Rothman, The Other 
Side of Garcia: The Right of Publicity and Copyright Preemption, 39 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 441 
(2016); Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 199 (2002). 
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confronted the scope or interpretation of the functionality doctrine 
in trademark law. The significance of the Lanham Act lies in its 
source: Both the Patent Act and the Lanham Act are creatures of 
Congress. As one commentator has observed: “Although it may be 
true that ‘[i]t is the province of patent law, not trademark law, to 
encourage invention by granting inventors a monopoly over new 
product designs or functions for a limited time,’ it is equally true 
that, as a matter of statutory law, there is nothing to prevent Con-
gress from altering this balance.”210 None of these cases answers 
the question of whether and to what extent the Constitution—
specifically the Patent and Copyright Clause211—creates a “right to 
copy” that overrides congressional attempts to regulate trade dress 
via the Lanham Act. 
Although Compco and Sears Roebuck cited the Patent and Copy-
right Clause in finding a broad “right to copy” anything outside 
the scope of federal patent and copyright law,212 as discussed 
above, the Supreme Court quickly retreated from this bright-line 
rule. The Court has noted that, in drafting the Patent Act, Con-
gress defined patentable subject matter to “include anything under 
the sun that is made by man.”213 A broad constitutional right to 
copy such subject matter—whether or not it is patentable or func-
tional—would render all forms of product design ineligible for pro-
tection as trade dress, in direct conflict with the plain language of 
the Lanham Act. The Lanham Act broadly defines trademarks to 
include any “symbol” or “device” that is used to “identify and 
distinguish” the goods of the producer from the goods of others, 
and “to indicate the source of the goods.”214 The Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                            
210 Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Copying in the Shadow of the Constitution: The Rational Limits 
of Trade Dress Protection, 80 MINN. L. REV. 595, 622 (1996) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995)). 
211 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
212 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964); Sears, Roebuck 
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228 (1964). 
213 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing legislative history of the 
Patent Act); see also Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 154 (noting that “the broadest reading of 
[Sears, Roebuck] would prohibit the States from regulating the deceptive simulation of 
trade dress or the tortious appropriation of private information” and rejecting that 
interpretation). 
214 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (defining the term “trademark”); see also id. § 1125(a) 
(creating a cause of action for infringement of unregistered marks, including trade dress). 
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has held that trade dress, including trade dress in the form of prod-
uct design, falls within this definition.215 No court has held that the 
Lanham Act’s inclusion of trade dress within the definition of a 
trademark is unconstitutional.  
The question therefore becomes whether and to what extent 
the functionality rule embedded in the Lanham Act is constitution-
ally compelled. The Supreme Court expressly declined to answer 
this question in TrafFix, a case that examined the significance of an 
expired utility patent in the context of a trade dress infringement 
claim filed under the Lanham Act.216 The Court noted that, if a 
case arose in which the functionality rule failed to prevent the pro-
tection of trade dress that was “the practical equivalent of an ex-
pired utility patent,” then “that will be time enough to consider 
the matter.”217 Arguably, TrafFix was such a case,218 but the Court 
still declined to rule on the issue. Rather, the Court broadly con-
strued the functionality doctrine, rejecting the concept of alterna-
tive designs, without elaborating upon the theoretical underpin-
nings of the rule. However, TrafFix at least implied that if trade 
dress protection under the Lanham Act had the practical effect of 
extending the life of a utility patent, it would undermine the pur-
pose of the Patent and Copyright Clause. 
The Constitution specifies that the lifetime of a patent must be 
“limited.”219 Congress has determined that the limit is twenty 
years from the date of filing the patent application.220 Trademarks, 
on the other hand, have no expiration date. They are valid and en-
forceable so long as the trademark holder continues to use the mark 
                                                                                                                            
215 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000); see also Qualitex, 
514 U.S. at 162 (“Since human beings might use as a ‘symbol’ or ‘device’ almost 
anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this [statutory] language, read literally, 
is not restrictive.”). 
216 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 35 (2001) (declining to 
decide whether the Patent Clause of the Constitution “prohibits the holder of an expired 
utility patent from claiming trade dress protection”). 
217 Id. 
218 Id. at 30 (“In the case before us, the central advance claimed in the expired utility 
patents . . . is the dual-spring design; and the dual-spring design is the essential feature of 
the trade dress MDI now seeks to establish and to protect.”). 
219 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
220 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012). 
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and does not abandon it.221 Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
Supreme Court has historically been reluctant to allow trade dress 
protection to “tack on” to an expired utility patent.222 Doing so 
may alter the terms of the “patent bargain” struck by an inventor 
who secures a temporary monopoly under the auspices of federal 
patent law.223 As the Court explained in Kellogg and Singer: 
[O]n the expiration of a patent the monopoly 
granted by it ceases to exist, and the right to make 
the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes 
public property. It is upon this condition that the pa-
tent is granted. It follows . . . that on the termination 
of the patent there passes to the public the right to 
make the machine in the form in which it was con-
structed during the patent. We may therefore dis-
miss without further comment the [unfair competi-
tion] complaint as to the form in which the defen-
dant made his machines.224 
These cases preceded the federalization of trademark law, and, 
therefore, they did not need to (and did not) ground their reasoning 
in the Constitution. However, a strong case can be made that the 
Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution compels this re-
sult.225 Once an inventor has accepted the benefit offered under the 
                                                                                                                            
221 Under the Lanham Act, the holder of a federally registered trademark may maintain 
that registration by filing a renewal application (attesting to continued use) and paying a 
specified fee every ten years. A trademark holder may renew the mark indefinitely so long 
as the mark has not been abandoned. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058–1059 (2012). A mark is 
considered “abandoned” when its “use has been discontinued with intent not to resume 
such use” or when the mark becomes generic or “otherwise lose[s] its significance as a 
mark.” Id. § 1127. 
222 See Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v. 
June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896). 
223 Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 120 (quoting Singer, 163 U.S. at 185). 
224 Id. 
225 Courts have been more willing to allow the extension of Lanham Act protection to 
material that is or was previously the subject of a federal design patent, as compared to 
utility patents. Design patents may be awarded to protect any “new, original and 
ornamental design for an article of manufacture.” 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012). As the Federal 
Circuit has noted: “[A] design patent, unlike a utility patent, limits protection to the 
ornamental design of the article.” Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1293 
(Fed. Cir. 2010). Not unlike trade dress law, design patent protection does not extend to 
functional designs. See Hupp v. Siroflex of Am., Inc., 122 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
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Constitution and federal patent laws—the grant of a monopoly that 
will be protected and enforced for a finite period of time by the fed-
eral courts—he must consent to the cessation of that monopoly at 
the patent’s expiration. The cost of accepting a monopoly pro-
tected by the state is the public dedication of the underlying inven-
tion at the end of the monopoly. The expiration of the patent mo-
nopoly therefore should obviate the need for competitors to con-
sider alternative designs. In other words, competitors should not 
need to “design around” a product configuration that is the subject 
of an expired utility patent, even if it has acquired secondary mean-
ing and acts as a source identifier. When a product design feature is 
functional for this reason, then alternative designs need not be part 
of the equation. However, as discussed later, competitors should 
still have a duty to refrain from public deception in the marketing 
of these products and may need to take affirmative steps to prevent 
consumer confusion, even if the product design is functional.226 
Moreover, most functionality cases do not involve a claim of trade 
dress protection asserted after the expiration of a utility patent. In 
these cases, fair competition, not patent law, should drive the doc-
trine. 
                                                                                                                            
(“A design or shape that is entirely functional, without ornamental or decorative aspect, 
does not meet the statutory criteria of a design patent.”). The scope of the functionality 
doctrine in the trade dress context, particularly in the post-TrafFix era, is broader than 
the functionality doctrine in the context of design patent law. See Peter Lee & Madhavi 
Sunder, Design Patents: Law Without Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 277, 282–83 (2013). 
However, the potential for conflict between the two federal statutes, the Lanham Act and 
the Patent Act, is significantly reduced in the context of design patents, as compared to 
utility patents, because the protections they afford are not at cross-purposes; if anything, 
they are duplicative of each other. More importantly, the constitutional concerns raised 
by extending trade dress protections to product features that were previously the subject 
of a design patent are simply not as significant as those created by extending trade dress 
protection to product features contained within an expired utility patent. Unlike federal 
laws protecting utility patents, design patent laws do not go to the heart of the 
constitutional admonition to “promote the [p]rogress of . . . useful [a]rts” by protecting, 
for limited times, the “[d]iscoveries” of inventors. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
Therefore, the two forms of patent protection are not (and should not be) entitled to the 
same level of deference, in terms of trademark protection. 
226 See infra text accompanying notes 302–09. 
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b)   Patent Law’s Impact on Functionality with Regard to 
Product Features Outside the Scope of Patent Law 
Although the TrafFix Court appeared to rule out consideration 
of alternative designs from the functionality equation generally, and 
not just in cases involving expired utility patents, the Court did not 
hold that the Constitution compelled this result.227 For the reasons 
discussed below, this Section argues that the broad conception of 
functionality articulated in TrafFix, one which focuses on utilita-
rianism rather than preservation of fair competition, is neither ne-
cessary nor effective to police the boundary between patent and 
trademark law. The key distinction between the two visions of 
functionality is the relevance (or lack thereof) of alternative de-
signs, when the party claiming trade dress protection has not pre-
viously sought and obtained patent protection for the relevant 
product design or feature. 
As discussed above, the Supreme Court articulated but quickly 
abandoned the notion that the Patent and Copyright Clause prec-
ludes any form of intellectual property protection for subject mat-
ter that is not entitled to a patent or a copyright.228 In retreating 
from this position, the Court cited trade secret law as an example 
of concurrent state and federal protection for subject matter that 
may or may not be patentable.229 Trade secret law has been a long-
standing alternative to federal patent protection. Congress has tole-
rated the existence of state trade secret laws for more than one 
hundred years and has never indicated that they threaten or are in-
consistent with federal patent law.230 Rather, Congress has recently 
                                                                                                                            
227 See discussion supra notes 116–21. 
228 See supra notes 201–09 and accompanying text. 
229 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155–56 (1989) (citing 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484–90 (1974)). In describing its decision 
in Kewanee, the Court noted that even though “state law protection was available for 
ideas which clearly fell within the subject matter of patent,” the “nature and degree of 
state protection did not conflict with the federal policies of encouragement of patentable 
invention and the prompt disclosure of such innovations.” Id. at 155. 
230 Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 493 (“Trade secret law and patent law have co-existed in 
this country for over one hundred years.”); see also id. at 494 (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(observing that “[s]tate trade secret laws and the federal patent laws have co-existed for 
many, many years,” during which “Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its full 
awareness of the existence of the trade secret system, without any indication of 
disapproval”). 
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chosen to expand trade secret protections by federalizing trade se-
cret law.231 
Many product features or designs that qualify for trade secret 
protection would also be considered functional under trademark 
law, even if they do not meet the requirements for patentability. In 
other words, a product feature that is functional in a utilitarian 
sense—one that is “essential to the use or purpose of the article” 
or affects its cost or quality232 may also be a trade secret. Rarely 
would an “arbitrary flourish”233 be the subject of trade secret pro-
tection. If the Constitution precluded all other forms of intellectual 
property protection of “functional” subject matter that was not 
patentable, trade secret law would surely have to go. Instead, the 
Supreme Court has explicitly held that state laws prohibiting theft 
of trade secrets do not conflict with, and are not preempted by, 
federal patent law.234 
                                                                                                                            
231 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. 114–153, 130 Stat. 376 (codified in 
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). The Defend Trade Secrets Act was passed by a 
unanimous vote in the U.S. Senate and was ratified in the U.S. House of Represenatives 
by a vote of 410 to 2. S.1890 – Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1890/all-actions?overview= 
closed&q=%7B%22roll-call-vote%22%3A%22all%22%7D [https://perma.cc/B3QK-53SX] 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2017). The federal act essentially codified the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act, a model rule that has been adopted by forty-eight states. David Enzminger, 
President Obama Signs Federal Defend Trade Secrets Act, IPWATCHDOG (May 13, 2016), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/05/13/obama-signs-defend-trade-secrets-act/id= 
69102/ [https://perma.cc/ZU7Q-GFYX]. Like the Lanham Act, federal jurisdiction for 
claims brought under the Defend Trade Secrets Act is based on the Commerce Clause. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1) (2012). 
232 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001). 
233 Id. at 34 (noting that the relevant design feature was not an “arbitrary flourish” but 
instead the “reason the device worked,” therefore rendering it functional). 
234 See generally Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. 470. Numerous federal circuits have also held 
that the Copyright Act does not preempt claims for misappropriation of a trade secret. 
See, e.g., Globeranger Corp. v. Software AG, Inc., 836 F.3d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 2016); 
Seng-Tiong Ho v. Taflove, 648 F.3d 489, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2011); Stromback v. New Line 
Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 302–05 (6th Cir. 2004); Dunn & Bradstreet Software Servs, Inc. v. 
Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2002); DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. 
Pulse Commc’ns Corp., 170 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Bateman v. Mnemonics, 
Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1549–50 (11th Cir. 1996); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 
Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 846–48 (10th Cir. 1993); Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 
F.2d 655, 658–60 (4th Cir. 1993); Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 
716–21 (2d Cir. 1992); S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1090 n.13 (9th Cir. 
1989). 
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Moreover, although not all trade secrets meet the requirements 
of patentability, many do. Therefore, inventors may choose be-
tween these intellectual property regimes (trade secret or patent 
law) when seeking to protect their inventions, even if the require-
ments of patentability are met.235 Whereas patent law offers a guar-
anteed monopoly for a finite period of time,236 trade secret law, 
somewhat like trademark law, offers more limited protection with 
no expiration date.237 The majority opinion in Kewanee Oil sur-
mised that inventors would rarely choose trade secret protection 
over patent law, because of the superior protections afforded under 
the federal patent regime.238 However, as Justice Marshall noted at 
the time,239 and as various commentators have argued,240 the 
choice of patent law over trade secret law is not a foregone conclu-
                                                                                                                            
235 Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 491–92 (holding that federal patent law does not preempt 
state trade secret laws, even if the underlying subject matter is patentable). 
236 The Supreme Court observed:  
In consideration of [an invention’s] disclosure and the consequent 
benefit to the community, the patent is granted. An exclusive 
enjoyment is guaranteed [the inventor] for seventeen years, but upon 
expiration of that period, the knowledge of the invention inures to the 
people, who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it and 
profit by its use. 
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (quoting United 
States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186–87 (1933)). 
237 See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 489–90 (noting that in many respects trade secret law 
provides weaker protections than patent law); 3 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, 
CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 14:15 (4th ed. 
2016) (describing key differences between protections afforded under patent and trade 
secret law). 
238 Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 490 (“The possibility that an inventor who believes his 
invention meets the standards of patentability will sit back, rely on trade secret law, and 
after one year of use forfeit any right to patent protection [due to disclosure] is remote 
indeed.” (citation omitted)). 
239 Id. at 493–94 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that, under some circumstances, 
trade secret protections may be “clearly superior to the [seventeen]-year monopoly 
afforded by the patent laws”). 
240 See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade 
Secret Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 
377 (2002); Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 623, 624 (2013) (arguing that corporations should prefer trade secret over patent 
protection of intellectual property); Mimi C. Goller, Is A Padlock Better Than A Patent?: 
Trade Secrets vs. Patents, 71 WIS. LAW., May 1998, at 20; R. Mark Halligan, Trade Secrets 
vs. Patents: The New Calculus, 2 LANDSLIDE, no. 7, July–Aug. 2010, at 10 (discussing 
relative merits of trade secret vs. patent protection). 
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sion, nor is it a rarity for an inventor to choose trade secret over 
patent law (or copyright law) when both are viable options.241 Due 
to the emphasis on secrecy in trade secret law (as the name im-
plies), proffering trade secret protection as an alternative to the pa-
tent bargain arguably does more to undermine the patent law in-
centive to invent and disclose242 than trade dress protection does, 
especially given that trade dress protection is limited by the func-
tionality doctrine. 
In upholding the viability of trade secret law in the face of the 
federal patent regime, as noted above, the Supreme Court empha-
sized the limitations of trade secret protection, in comparison to 
the temporary monopoly granted under federal patent law.243 By 
contrast, in striking down the Florida law protecting boat hull de-
signs in Bonito Boats, the Court emphasized that the state statute 
offered protections that were more, not less, monopolistic than 
those available under federal patent law.244 The limitations of 
trademark law, which does not simply prohibit the copying of trade 
dress, are key to its peaceful coexistence with the Patent and Copy-
right Clause. 
The protection afforded to trade dress under the Lanham Act is 
(or should be) more akin to trade secret law than the Florida statute 
in Bonito Boats, for two basic reasons. First, trade dress is protecta-
ble under trademark law only if it is distinctive—that is, it is acting 
as a source identifier for the underlying product.245 Moreover, the 
types of trade dress most commonly subjected to a functionality 
bar—color and product design—are protectable only with a show-
                                                                                                                            
241 See also GlobeRanger Corp. v. Software AG U.S., Inc., 836 F.3d 477, 483–84 (5th 
Cir. 2016) (noting that a creator may choose between the protections of trade secret law 
or federal copyright law, depending on whether she more highly values the lack of 
disclosure requirements under the trade secret regime or the guaranteed yet limited 
monopoly extended under copyright law). 
242 See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 494 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“I have no doubt that 
the existence of trade secret protection provides in some instances a substantial 
disincentive to entrance into the patent system, and thus deprives society of the benefits 
of public disclosure of the invention which it is the policy of the patent laws to 
encourage.”). 
243 Id. 489–90 (majority opinion). 
244 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989). 
245 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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ing of acquired distinctiveness.246 The requirements of patentabili-
ty, as described above, do not include a finding of distinctiveness, 
either inherent or acquired. Second, and more importantly, trade-
mark protections are not monopolistic in the same manner as pa-
tents (and copyrights): trademark rights are not held “in gross.”247 
Because proof of trademark infringement requires proof of a like-
lihood of consumer confusion, not just copying, it does not confer 
the same type of monopoly accorded to inventors under patent law. 
Nevertheless, many useful (but not patentable) product features 
that might otherwise be considered distinctive trade dress are not 
protectable under trademark law, as a result of the functionality 
doctrine. In this context, however, the driving policy consideration 
behind the doctrine is or should be the preservation of fair competi-
tion, not a perceived conflict with patent law. 
Some recent developments in trademark law have threatened 
to undermine its limitations, blurring the distinctions between tra-
ditional trademark protection and the monopolies conferred by pa-
tents and copyrights.248 The federal trademark dilution statute, in 
particular, comes dangerously close to conferring monopolies on 
trademark holders, with little to no justification or benefit.249 How-
                                                                                                                            
246 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 206 (2000) (holding that 
“[d]esign, like color, is not inherently distinctive”). 
247 See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (concluding 
that a trademark right is not “a right in gross or at large, like a statutory copyright or a 
patent for an invention, to either of which, in truth, it has little or no analogy”); see also 
Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1800–01 (observing that “a fundamental tenet of 
trademark law has always been that, unlike copyrights and patents, trademarks are not 
held ‘in gross,’ and therefore the trademark holder’s right to prohibit others’ use of the 
mark is limited to circumstances in which that use harms consumers, as determined via 
the ‘likelihood of confusion’ standard”). 
248 See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024–
29  (9th Cir. 2004) (reversing district court grant of summary judgment on trademark 
infringement claim due to existence of disputed issues of fact regarding initial interest 
confusion); Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Ent’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1057–
58 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding likelihood of success on the merits of trademark infringement 
claim based on a theory of initial interest confusion); Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 
944 F.2d 1235, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding trademark infringement, despite the absence 
of consumer confusion at the point of sale, based on a theory of post-sale confusion). 
249 See Sandra L. Rierson, The Myth and Reality of Dilution, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 
212, 291 (2012) (observing that “[d]ilution laws come close to granting trademark rights 
‘in gross’”). The article argued that the benefits of dilution law are outweighed by the 
costs that it imposes on consumers and competitors. Id. at 212–304. 
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ever, federal trademark dilution law applies only to “famous” 
marks.250 Trade dress in the form of product design is considered a 
weak form of trademark,251 and therefore rarely if ever should be 
entitled to protection under federal trademark dilution law.252 
Therefore, in practice, trademark dilution law should have a mi-
nimal impact on the doctrine of functionality, given its general in-
applicability to forms of trade dress that could be deemed function-
al. 
The final reason for relying on competition policy, rather than 
patent law incentives, to define the boundaries of functionality is a 
practical one. If the core purpose of the trademark functionality 
doctrine is to police the boundary between patent and trademark 
law (even in cases involving non-patentable subject matter), then it 
should be more clearly linked to the contours of the patentability 
determination rather than vague notions of utility. Many types of 
trade dress deemed functional under Inwood’s two-part test appear 
to have little if any connection to the concept of patentability. The 
color blue, for example, was deemed functional when applied to a 
surgical probe because of its visibility during surgical procedures.253 
It is difficult to see how the constitutional purpose of spurring in-
novation and disclosure of invention is aided by denying trade dress 
protection to the maker of a distinctive blue surgical probe, when 
the benefits conferred by the color blue could just as easily have 
been achieved through the use of alternative colors. 
                                                                                                                            
250 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012). 
251 See Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 213 (2000) (noting that “[c]onsumers are aware . . . 
that, almost invariably, even the most unusual of product designs . . . is intended not to 
identify the source, but to render the product itself more useful or more appealing”). 
252 See Rierson, supra note 249, at 298–300, 307–08 (arguing that dilution law is 
particularly inappropriate as applied to trade dress infringement claims, and that the 
federal dilution statute should be amended to eliminate trade dress dilution claims); see 
also Robert G. Bone, A Skeptical View of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 11 INTELL. 
PROP. L. BULL. 187, 196–98 (2007) (criticizing the Trademark Dilution Revision Act for 
extending dilution protection to trade dress); Paul Heald, Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. The 
West Bend Co.: Exposing the Malign Application of the Federal Dilution Statute to Protect 
Product Configuration, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 415, 423–24 (1998) (arguing that the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act should not be construed to apply to trade dress). 
253 See ERBE Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady Tech. LLC, 629 F.3d 1278, 1289 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010). 
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3. Functionality and Alternative Designs 
As described above, a competitor’s access to alternative de-
signs, enabling it to effectively compete without creating a likelih-
ood of confusion with the plaintiff’s trade dress, was for many 
years a central focus in functionality analysis.254 However, the Su-
preme Court’s decision in TrafFix has, at a minimum, called into 
question the relevance of alternative designs in the functionality 
doctrine. According to most circuits, TrafFix held that alternative 
designs are irrelevant to the functionality equation, except in cases 
of aesthetic functionality.255 By removing this piece of the functio-
nality equation in all cases—not just those that implicate a direct 
conflict with patent law—the Court has unnecessarily broadened 
the doctrine and hindered its ability to enhance free and fair com-
petition. 
In comparing word marks and trade dress, Professor Graeme 
Dinwoodie argued that the exclusionary effect of trademark protec-
tion in words, measured in competitive terms, is slight compared to 
the potential exclusionary effect of extending trademark protection 
to aspects of product design.256 Professor Dinwoodie explained: 
“[I]t is easy to adopt an alternative label for a competing product; 
the part of the lexical commons that is appropriated by the first 
producer is very small.”257 By comparison, “the supply of shapes 
by which to design a particular product is more confined.”258 How-
ever, the relative availability of competitively acceptable alterna-
tives—be they words or forms of trade dress—is a fact-intensive 
inquiry that should  be examined in each individual case. 
Whether a host of competitive alternatives (or none) exists va-
ries from case to case, regardless of whether the source identifier at 
issue is in the form of a word or trade dress. As described above, 
the genericism doctrine comes into play, particularly in cases of 
genericide, because there is no competitively acceptable alternative 
to the trademarked word.259 Of course there would be, in theory, a 
                                                                                                                            
254 See supra notes 91–102 and accompanying text. 
255 See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text. 
256 Dinwoodie, supra note 62, at 632–37. 
257 Id. at 634. 
258 Id. at 637. 
259 See supra notes 176–90 and accompanying text. 
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host of words that the competitor could adopt as his own trade-
mark, but they would not have any significance in the mind of the 
consumer. For example, if Bayer’s competitor had called its drug 
the fanciful name Zinga, it would not have been sued for infringing 
the Aspirin trademark. However, it also would have been at a dis-
tinct competitive disadvantage, because consumers would not have 
known what “Zinga” was. In the Qualitex case, by contrast, the 
court noted that competitors could choose among a host of alterna-
tive colors for their dry-cleaning pads, all of which would serve the 
utilitarian purpose of hiding stains.260 Even though the plaintiff’s 
specific color (green-gold) was in some sense utilitarian, it was not 
functional because there were several competitively equivalent 
substitutes.261 
In the functionality context, when the extension of trade dress 
protection would not effectively extend the life of an expired utility 
patent, the court should examine (1) whether any alternatives to 
the plaintiff’s trade dress exist that would not negatively impact the 
cost or the quality of the product, and (2) whether forcing the de-
fendant to choose one of those alternatives would have a negative 
competitive effect. In some contexts, as Professor Dinwoodie ob-
served, the range of alternatives will be limited or perhaps nonexis-
tent.262 In others, however, they may be plentiful. 
Eliminating the courts’ ability to perform this analysis yields 
limited benefits and may impose significant costs. Restricting the 
functionality doctrine to the narrow question of whether a product 
feature is utilitarian is not necessary to avoid a conflict with patent 
law because, as explained above, the rule is over-inclusive.263 Nor is 
such a rule warranted by the policy of preserving free competition. 
Sometimes choosing a substitute for plaintiff’s distinctive trade 
dress is competitively costly to the defendant; sometimes it is not. 
Allowing a defendant to copy the plaintiff’s distinctive trade dress 
with no consideration as to whether it is competitively necessary to 
do so, when a likelihood of confusion may result, may undermine 
rather than foster fair competition. 
                                                                                                                            
260 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995). 
261 Id. 
262 Dinwoodie, supra note 62, at 637. 
263 See supra notes 228–53 and accompanying text. 
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C. The Genericism and Functionality Doctrines Should Not Enable 
Free Riding and Consumer Confusion 
As noted above, the doctrines of genericism and functionality 
both derive from the common-law tort of unfair competition.264 
The doctrines seek to limit the scope of trademark protection so 
that it does not unfairly limit the ability to compete. Logically, 
when the doctrines have the opposite effect—when the generic or 
functional label enables rather than prevents unfair competition—
courts should be able and willing to take steps designed to prevent 
that result. Consumer confusion imposes costs on consumers and 
trademark holders alike, and therefore all aspects of trademark law 
should seek to prevent it.265 
Aspects of both the genericism and functionality doctrines, par-
ticularly in more recent cases, tolerate consumer confusion (or the 
potential for it) to varying degrees. For example, modern decisions 
interpreting the doctrine of functionality have largely abandoned 
unfair competition protections for designs or product features 
deemed functional. As to generic words or phrases, the “once ge-
neric always generic” mantra also results in the failure to protect 
words that have acquired (or reacquired) secondary meaning. As a 
result of both policies, consumers may be confused and trademark 
holders may be harmed. 
1. Genericism and the Problem of Trademark Incapacity or 
De Facto Secondary Meaning 
The doctrine of trademark incapacity,266 or “de facto second-
ary meaning,”267 presents itself in two aspects of the genericism 
                                                                                                                            
264 See supra Sections I.A–I.B. 
265 See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 
2124 (2004) (noting that, when consumer confusion results, the cost of a “false negative 
error”—failure to extend trademark protection when it is due—is more costly than a 
“false positive error,” i.e., extending trademark protection when it is not warranted); 
Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1798–99 (explaining search cost rationale for trademark 
protection); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory 
or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L. J. 461, 482 (2005) (explaining how trademark infringement 
increases consumer search costs). 
266 Altman & Pollock, supra note 237, § 20:33; Jake Linford, A Linguistic Justification for 
Protecting ‘Generic’ Trademarks, 17 YALE J. L. & TECH. 110, 113–14 (2015) (defining 
trademark incapacity as a doctrine under which “courts dismiss evidence that consumers 
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doctrine. First, numerous courts have held that, once a name or 
term has been deemed generic (either formally, by a court, or in-
formally, in a dictionary), it can never function as a trademark, 
even if it subsequently acquires distinctiveness in the minds of con-
sumers.268 Second, in determining the trademark significance of a 
word in the first instance, courts that have placed a word or term in 
the generic category will often ignore or refuse to consider evi-
dence suggesting that its primary significance is that of a source 
identifier (the traditional definition of a trademark).269 Such cases 
beg the question of how a word or term can truly be generic if evi-
dence suggests that the primary significance of the term is that of a 
source identifier in the commercial marketplace. Some degree of 
consumer confusion is bound to result when courts decline to pro-
                                                                                                                            
perceive a [generic] term as source-identifying” on grounds that such secondary meaning 
is “legally insignificant”). 
267 Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1831 (noting that “‘de facto’ secondary 
meaning . . . is the legal equivalent of no secondary meaning”). 
268 See, e.g., Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 810–12 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(“No manufacturer can take out of the language a word . . . that has generic meaning as to 
a category of products and appropriate it for its own trademark use . . . .” (citations 
omitted)); Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 375–76 (1st Cir. 1980) (“No 
amount of purported proof that a generic term has acquired a secondary meaning 
associating it with a particular producer can transform that term into a registrable 
trademark.” (citations omitted)). In his treatise, McCarthy wrote that “[o]nly in an 
extraordinarily rare case could a name once recognized in the past as a generic name be 
raised from the public domain to become a trademark by a change in consumer usage over 
a significant period of time.” 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 63, § 12:11. Under McCarthy’s 
reasoning, only old terms that are “generally unknown in current usage” would be subject 
to reappropriation as a trademark. Id. 
269 See, e.g., Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 
1045 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“A generic term that acquires de facto secondary meaning is 
still not afforded trademark protection.” (citing 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 63, at § 12:15)); 
Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 924 n.4 (10th Cir. 1986) 
(“Trademarks that have become generic are subject to cancellation even if they have 
acquired a secondary meaning.”); Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Med. Dental Surgeries, 
Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting that a generic term “cannot become a 
trademark under any circumstances”); Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 
561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1977) (“[E]ven proof of secondary meaning . . . cannot transform 
a generic term into a subject for trademark.”); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting 
World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that secondary meaning cannot save a 
generic term); CES Publ’g Corp. v. St. Regis Publ’ns, Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 15 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(stating that “merely descriptive” terms can be “rescued as trademarks” via proof of 
secondary meaning, but generic terms cannot). 
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tect words or phrases as trademarks when, as a practical matter, 
they are functioning in that capacity.270 
a) The Pitfalls of “[L]inguistic [G]rave-[D]igging”271 
The “once generic, always generic” doctrine holds that, if a 
word has functioned in the lexicon as a generic term at any point in 
time, the word can never be protected as a trademark, even if its 
meaning has evolved such that few people are even aware of its ge-
neric meaning. In linguistic terms, the law ignores the reality of 
“semantic shift,” the process by which words change in mean-
ing.272 More accurately stated, the law recognizes semantic shift in 
only one direction: the shift that occurs when a trademark loses its 
source-identifying significance and becomes a generic term, com-
monly known as genericide.273 However, when a word evolves in 
the opposite direction—a semantic shift known as “restric-
tion”274—the law typically provides no protection for the relevant 
word or term, even when consumers perceive it as a source iden-
tifier. 
For example, the Second Circuit declined to extend protection 
to the term “Hog” as applied to a motorcycle manufactured by 
Harley Davidson, despite evidence that it was functioning as a 
                                                                                                                            
270 Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1833 (noting that “[i]f the ‘primary significance’ of 
a term in the commercial context is that of a source identifier, consumers generally do not 
benefit when competitors are allowed to use the word generically”). 
271 Professor Jake Linford referred to the process by which courts rely on outdated 
meanings of terms in dictionaries and similar sources as “linguistic grave-digging.” 
Linford, supra note 266, at 146. Similarly, trademark attorney Jerre Swann referred to this 
phenomenon as “generic bones in . . . the closet.” Swann, supra note 169, at 654. 
272 Linford, supra note 266, at 113 (defining semantic shift); see also Desai & Rierson, 
supra note 6, at 1839 (discussing the phenomenon of “hybrid” trademarks and noting that 
“[d]espite trademark holders’ best efforts to the contrary, a trademark is much like any 
other word, and therefore its meaning and use—depending on the context—will evolve 
over time”). 
273 See Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1821–22 (describing the process of genericide); 
see also Linford, supra note 266, at 149–50 (describing and redefining the doctrine as 
“generislide”). 
274 Linford, supra note 266, at 115 (explaining that “restriction” occurs when a word 
“undergoes a shift in meaning from a broad designator for all members within a category 
to a prototypical member of the category”). 
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mark.275 In doing so, the court relied on evidence of “generic” use 
of the term in dictionaries and in the media for decades preceding 
the word’s evolution as a mark.276 The Second Circuit reasoned 
that “[t]he public has no more right than a manufacturer to with-
draw from the language a generic term, already applicable to the 
relevant category of products, and accord it trademark significance, 
at least as long as the term retains some generic meaning.”277 
The courts’ refusal to recognize the evolution of the lexicon (or 
“semantic shift”) elevates form over substance. If the public can 
divest a word of its trademark significance by transforming it into a 
generic word (via the process of genericide), then it should also be 
able to invest a term previously considered generic with acquired 
distinctiveness.278 Like the tides, the meaning of language both 
ebbs and flows. However, as noted above, courts have been reluc-
tant or unwilling to recognize that “[l]iving languages are not stat-
ic,”279 at least when assessing the trademark significance of pre-
viously generic words. 
Although courts in a limited number of cases have allowed 
words previously considered generic to function as trademarks, the 
courts have done so only under a narrow set of circumstances,280 
typically when the generic meaning of the words has been all but 
obliterated.281 As some commentators have argued, courts should 
                                                                                                                            
275 Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 810–12 (2d Cir. 1999); see also 
Linford, supra note 266, at 141 (citing use of the term “Hog” in Harley Davidson as an 
example of restriction). 
276 Harley Davidson, 164 F.3d. at 810–11 & n.8. 
277 Id. at 812. 
278 See Swann, supra note 169, at 653 (arguing for a genericism doctrine that would give 
“full reign to the dynamics of language”). 
279 Linford, supra note 266, at 131. 
280 Courts have been slightly more willing to accord protection to generic words that 
once functioned as trademarks, fell victim to genericide, and then reacquired source-
identifying significance. See, e.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. Briley, 207 F.2d 519, 520 & n.3 (5th 
Cir. 1953) (holding that Singer could function as a trademark for sewing machines, 
because the company had “recaptured [the name] from the public domain”); Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. H. Rosenthal Co., 246 F. Supp. 724, 729 (D. Minn. 1965) (holding 
that Goodyear Rubber was a valid trademark, with proof of secondary meaning, despite 
prior finding of genericness); see also Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1832 (discussing 
cases). 
281 See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 655 F.2d 5, 8 n.2 (1st Cir. 
1981) (“Where a generic association of a word or term has become obsolete and is 
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apply the primary significance test to determine whether a word or 
term is functioning as a trademark in the collective mind of the 
consuming public, regardless of whether the word, at some pre-
vious point in time, would have been considered generic.282 Cur-
rently, they do not.283 
The Lanham Act does not bar courts from extending trademark 
protection to formerly generic words or terms. Arguably, their fail-
ure to do so violates the plain language of the Act.284 The Lanham 
Act provides only one definition of “generic” terms that are not 
subject to protection: “The primary significance of the registered 
mark to the relevant public . . . shall be the test for determining 
whether the registered mark has become the generic name of goods 
or services on or in connection with which it has been used.”285 
Although this provision specifically relates to mark cancellation, 
the text does not suggest a different definition of “generic” in the 
                                                                                                                            
discoverable only by resort to historical sources or dictionaries compiled on historical 
principles to preserve from oblivion obsolete words, then, from the viewpoint of 
trademark and like law, the word or term is no longer a generic word.”). One 
commentator has characterized this standard as “so high as to be practically 
insurmountable.” See Peter J. Brody, Comment, Reprotection for Formerly Generic Words, 
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 475, 491 (2015). 
282 See Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1832–33 (arguing that competitors should not 
be allowed to use a word generically if “the ‘primary significance’ of a term in the 
commercial context is that of a source identifier”); Linford, supra note 266, at 162–66 
(arguing that courts should apply the primary significance test to determine whether 
formerly generic words have attained trademark significance); Brody, supra note 281, at 
508 (concluding that the primary significance test embodied in the Lanham Act should be 
used as the test to determine whether a word or term should be considered generic “in all 
instances”); cf. ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 266, § 20:33 (arguing that previously 
generic words should be protected as marks if there has been a “complete 
transformation” of their meaning). 
283 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., No. 01-CV 02115-ORD, 2004 WL 
329250, at *2 (W.D. Wash., Feb. 10, 2004) (refusing to instruct the jury that, “even if 
[Microsoft’s Windowns trademark] were generic prior to November 1985, the trademark 
would nonetheless be valid today so long as the primary significance of the term today is 
not generic”). 
284 The Second Circuit observed: “The ‘primary significance test’ is the law of the 
land; it was adopted by the Supreme Court in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., and 
subsequently codified by Congress in the Trademark Clarification Act of 1984.” Genesee 
Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). 
285 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012). This section of the Lanham Act relates specifically to 
mark cancellation on the grounds that the mark has become generic. No alternative 
definition of “generic” appears elsewhere in the Act. 
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context of mark registration or in terms of protecting unregistered 
trademarks. For the policy reasons stated above and as a matter of 
statutory interpretation, the primary significance of a putative mark 
in the commercial marketplace, not its etymological history, should 
determine whether it is eligible for trademark protection. 
b) Rethinking De Facto Secondary Meaning 
Another context in which the genericism doctrine currently de-
clines to extend protection to putative marks, under circumstances 
that could lead to a likelihood of confusion, relates specifically to 
the use of marks that fall close to the line demarcating the boun-
dary between generic and descriptive. These marks are perhaps 
best characterized as “highly descriptive,” because, on their face, 
they look like descriptive word marks: They “convey [an] imme-
diate idea of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the 
goods.”286 Examples of highly descriptive terms found to be gener-
ic include Surgicenters,287 Lite Beer,288 Filipino Yellow Pages,289 
and Diet Chocolate Fudge Soda.290 In all of these cases, courts 
have found that the seemingly descriptive name referred to a prod-
uct genus/class of goods rather than a species/particular product. 
As explained by the court in A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 
“some terms so directly signify the nature of the product that in-
terests of competition demand that other producers be able to use 
them even if terms have or might become identified with a 
source . . . .”291 In other words, “[c]ourts refuse to protect a gener-
ic term because competitors need it more to describe their goods 
than the claimed [mark holder] needs it to distinguish its goods 
from others.”292 Of course, competitors could choose an inherently 
distinctive mark to denote their own products, but courts have fo-
                                                                                                                            
286 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976). 
287 Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Med. Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1014 (9th 
Cir. 1979). 
288 See Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 561 F.2d 75, 80 (7th Cir. 
1977) (finding “Lite Beer” to be generic). 
289 Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ’ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
290 A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 297 (3d Cir. 1986). 
291 Id. at 304. 
292 Id. 
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cused on their need to use the putative mark for its descriptive 
properties. 
As the court recognized in Canfield, denying protection to 
marks that have acquired distinctiveness imposes costs on consum-
ers and on the trademark holder.293 It is unclear why it is necessary 
to use the blunt instrument of genericism in this context to pre-
serve competitors’ ability to “describe their goods.”294 That is, of 
course, the primary purpose of the fair use doctrine.295 Presumably, 
a competitor can describe his goods using the same or similar 
words as a descriptive trademark without committing trademark 
infringement, even if there are few other words available to de-
scribe the relevant goods. The claim of infringement would be via-
ble only if the competitor chose to use the same descrip-
tive/generic name as its own trademark. To the extent the fair use 
doctrine is not broad enough to allow for robust competition in this 
regard, a better solution may be to expand the scope of fair use ra-
ther than declare the relevant mark generic. At a minimum, as dis-
cussed below, marks that fall into this category should receive some 
degree of protection from unfair competition and passing off, even 
if deemed generic.296 
2. Courts Should Prevent Unfair Competition Even If 
Trademarks Are Deemed Functional or Generic 
As previously discussed, under the common law and under the 
Lanham Act, generic words or phrases and functional product fea-
tures or designs are not entitled to protection as trademarks. How-
ever, common law courts nonetheless ordered defendants to take 
steps to ensure that a competitor’s use of generic words or phrases 
and/or functional product features did not result in deliberate pass-
ing off or even unintentional consumer confusion. Unfortunately, 
this common-law tradition has somewhat faded in the context of 
generic words, and all but disappeared in the functionality context. 
                                                                                                                            
293 Id. at 308; see also Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1830 (“When secondary meaning 
is established and the putative mark is functioning as a source-identifier, confusion and 
inefficiency may result when the mark is deemed ‘generic’ and free for all to use.”). 
294 A.J. Canfield Co., 808 F.2d at 304. 
295 See Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 
1025, 1041–43 (9th Cir. 2010) (defining and applying descriptive fair use doctrine). 
296 See infra notes 297–309 and accompanying text. 
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These cases should not be controversial. A court dispensing equit-
able remedies (which are typical in trademark infringement cases) 
should shape such remedies in a manner sufficient to prevent the 
consumer fraud and unfair competition that may result when words 
or product features have acquired distinctiveness, but nonetheless 
cannot be protected from trademark infringement as a result of the 
genericism or functionality doctrine. 
a) Intermediate Protection for Generic Words 
Some of the most well-known cases illustrating genericide pro-
vided some form of relief to the plaintiff/trademark holder despite 
deeming the mark at issue generic. For example, in the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of the name “Shredded Wheat” as applied to ce-
real, the Court held that, although the name did not deserve pro-
tection as a trademark because it had become generic, the defen-
dant nevertheless had a duty to use “reasonable care to inform the 
public of the source of its product.”297 In this case, the Court found 
that defendant Kellogg Company’s use of a distinctive label and 
carton was sufficient to demonstrate that it was “fairly” using the 
Shredded Wheat name.298 Many courts have shaped injunctive re-
lief in genericide cases to limit a competitor’s ability to use a gener-
ic word or term when necessary to prevent consumer confusion 
and thereby ensure fair competition.299 Although many of these 
                                                                                                                            
297 Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118–19 (1938). The Court noted that, 
even though the “Shredded Wheat” brand had been deemed generic, “[t]he question 
remains whether Kellogg Company in exercising its right to use the name ‘Shredded 
Wheat’ and the pillow-shaped biscuit, is doing so fairly. Fairness requires that it be done 
in a manner which reasonably distinguishes its product from that of plaintiff.” Id. at 120; 
see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 735(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1938). 
298 Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 120–21 (noting that the Kellogg cartons “do not resemble those 
used by the plaintiff either in size, form, or color,” and that the “difference in the labels is 
striking”). 
299 See, e.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 203–04 (1896) (holding 
that, even though the word “Singer” had “become public property, and the defendant 
had a right to use it,” defendant was enjoined from using the word “Singer” on any of its 
machines or in any of its advertisements “without clearly and unmistakably stating . . . 
that the machines [were] made by the defendant,” and therefore were not the product of 
the Singer Manufacturing Company); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 
321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963) (affirming district court order that, although the word 
“thermos” was deemed generic, plaintiff’s competitor “must invariably precede the use 
of the word ‘thermos’ by the possessive of the name ‘Aladdin’; . . . [c]onfine its use of 
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cases precede the passage of the 1946 Lanham Act and resulting 
federalization of trademark law, some more recent cases have also 
imposed such restrictions or recognized the defendant’s duty to do 
so.300 
Fewer cases have imposed restrictions on defendants, vis-à-vis 
the use of generic words that have acquired so-called de facto sec-
ondary meaning, if those words did not start their linguistic life 
cycle as a valid trademark.301 In other words, courts have been 
more willing to extend such protections when the word or term is 
deemed unprotectable due to genericide, rather than an initial de-
termination that the word is generic. The reason for this distinction 
is unclear. The potential for likelihood of consumer confusion and 
its attendant economic costs exists regardless of whether the word 
or term in question was once recognized as a trademark. The pur-
pose of providing limited forms of relief in these types of cases is 
not to provide a consolation prize to disappointed trademark hold-
ers whose marks were once distinctive and valuable. The point is to 
avoid consumer confusion and the costs that it imposes on con-
sumers and competitors alike. If that is the goal, then the original 
status of the relevant mark should be irrelevant in making this de-
termination. 
                                                                                                                            
‘thermos’ to the lower-case ‘t’; and . . . never use the words ‘original’ or ‘genuine’ in 
describing its product,” to “eliminate confusion and the possibility of deceit”); DuPont 
Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1936) (noting that defendant 
should identify its product as “Sylvania cellophane” when filling orders or in 
advertisements, “in the interest of justice”). 
300 See, e.g., Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 
1989) (finding the term “murphy bed” to be generic but enjoining defendant’s “passing 
off” of his product as “original” Murphy Beds by the “Murphy Bed Co. of America” 
under the doctrine of unfair competition). 
301 Swann, supra note 169, at 646 (observing that “the limited protection that may be 
afforded dual use terms to protect their trademark significance is not available when a 
mark starts out generic” (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted)). But see 
Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 
1989) (finding the term “Blinded American Veteran’s Association” generic, but 
remanding case for further findings regarding consumer confusion and suggesting that, if 
evidence of “passing off” existed, a disclaimer could be required). 
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b) Preventing Confusion in the Copying of Functional 
Designs 
Common law applications of the functionality doctrine, like the 
early decisions in the genericism/genericide context, recognized 
functionality as part of the broader law of unfair competition and 
therefore imposed limitations on the use of “functional” product 
features when necessary to prevent consumer confusion and pass-
ing off.302 Under the Lanham Act and the case law interpreting it, 
however, a court may refuse to consider evidence of secondary 
meaning, once a product feature is deemed functional.303 This for-
malistic approach to functionality effectively precludes more li-
mited forms of protection (such as labels or disclaimers designed to 
prevent consumer deception), which should otherwise be available 
under a common law claim for unfair competition, even if a distinc-
tive product feature does not qualify for protection as a trademark. 
Commentators have criticized this shift by the courts as injurious 
to both consumers and competitors alike.304 
The functionality doctrine’s absolute nature—particularly 
when combined with its ambiguities and breadth of scope under the 
Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix—can create unfair competi-
tion and harm consumers. For example, in ERBE Elektromedizin 
GmbH v. Canady Technology LLC, the Federal Circuit found that 
the maker of blue endoscopic surgical probes had failed to carry its 
burden of proof in establishing the non-functionality of the blue 
                                                                                                                            
302 See supra notes 75–76, 85 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
TORTS § 741(b)(ii) (AM. LAW INST. 1938) (providing that distinctive product features that 
are functional should not be copies without taking “reasonable steps to inform 
prospective purchasers that the goods which [defendant] markets are not those of the 
[plaintiff]”); § 741 cmt. j (“If an imitated feature is functional but has also acquired 
generally in the market a special significance as an indication of the source of the goods, 
the imitation is privileged if it is accompanied by reasonable effort to avoid deceiving 
prospective purchasers as to the source.”). 
303 See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001) (noting 
that, because the Court had found the relevant product feature to be functional, whether 
it had acquired secondary meaning “need not be considered”). 
304 See Dinwoodie, supra note 62, at 746–51 (arguing in favor of awarding limited forms 
of relief to protect functional designs, when evidence of consumer confusion is present); 
Thurmon, supra note 58, at 344–46 (critiquing application of the functionality doctrine as 
a complete bar to trademark protection in cases where consumer confusion would likely 
result). 
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color of the probes, noting that plaintiff had failed to “present a 
genuine issue of material fact that the color blue does not make the 
probe more visible through an endoscopic camera or that such a 
color mark would not lead to anti-competitive effects.”305 The 
court rejected plaintiff’s evidence that other colors (anything other 
than beige or red) would have been clearly visible during endoscop-
ic procedures.306 As a result, the court granted summary judgment 
to the defendant and allowed it to continue copying the blue color 
and black markings of plaintiff’s endoscopic probes.307 
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Newman noted 
that the defendant had admitted to deliberately copying the plain-
tiff’s trade dress, in the form of the blue color and black markings 
on the probes.308 Defendant’s deliberate copying, combined with 
what Judge Newman believed to be “evidence of likelihood of con-
fusion as to the source and identity of the probe,” combined to 
pose a threat to the public interest, particularly given that the rele-
vant product was used in the surgical field.309 The possibility of 
consumer deception posed by this case could have been ameli-
orated by either (1) more narrowly construing the doctrine of func-
tionality to prevent defendant’s copying of plaintiff’s trade dress in 
the first instance, or (2) imposing equitable limitations on the de-
fendant to restrict its ability to dress up its surgical probes as those 
of the plaintiff, such as disclaimers in advertising, labeling, or pack-
aging. The court’s refusal to extend any form of protection to the 
plaintiff’s trade dress increased the likelihood of consumer decep-
tion and competitive injury to the original manufacturer. 
                                                                                                                            
305 629 F.3d 1278, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also id. at 1288 (noting that “[c]olor may 
not be granted trademark protection if the color performs a utilitarian function in 
connection with the goods it identifies or there are specific competitive advantages for 
use”). The Federal Circuit heard this case because the trademark functionality issue was 
decided concurrently with a patent infringement claim, over which the Federal Circuit 
had exclusive jurisdiction. 
306 Id. at 1289. 
307 Id. at 1291. 
308 Id. at 1293 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
309 Id. Judge Newman observed that “[t]he public interest in avoidance of deception or 
confusion looms particularly large in the medical/surgical field, where the surgeon’s 
experience of quality and performance, on recognition of the surgical device by its unique 
color, is a matter of public concern.” Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
The doctrines of trademark genericism and functionality 
emerged from the common law of unfair competition, as courts 
recognized that expanding trademark protections could have the 
unintentional effect of impairing competition or illegitimately ex-
panding upon a party’s patent monopoly. However, in keeping 
with their overriding goal of suppressing free riding and consumer 
fraud, the courts consistently maintained a duty on the part of de-
fendants to refrain from  using source-identifying words or product 
features in ways that resulted in consumer deception and loss of 
goodwill. This flexible common-law approach has been supplanted 
by more rigid doctrinal rules that attempt to draw brighter lines be-
tween generic or functional subject matter and registrable trade-
marks. Although bright-line rules have the supposed benefit of eli-
minating ambiguity and its attendant transaction costs, in many 
ways these more rigid rules have had the opposite effect. The codi-
fication of the genericism and functionality doctrines in the Lan-
ham Act, and the heightened importance of trademark registration 
under the Act, has enhanced the significance of the doctrines and 
therefore magnified the potential harm imposed by unpredictable 
rules that may elevate form over substance. 
Repurposing the genericism and functionality doctrines toward 
their original underlying principle would benefit trademark holders 
and consumers alike. Unlike more controversial areas of trademark 
law, such as the federal trademark dilution statute, expansion or 
clarification of trademark rights in this context would not restrict 
competition at the expense of consumers or endanger free speech. 
When defining the boundaries of trademark law—which the gene-
ricism and functionality doctrines are designed to do—courts 
should adopt a pragmatic approach that embraces and reflects the 
common-law roots of trademark law itself: the preservation of free 
and fair competition. 
